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INTRODUCTION
What divides the justices of the Supreme Court in a number of contemporary cases
involving speech at the core of the First Amendment? The near uniformity of vision
that sparked the Court's renovation of libel law in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan'
in the 1960s, its barricade against prior restraint in the 1970s,2 and its philosophy
of openness in the access-to-court cases of the 1980s and 1990s 3 has fragmented
* Charles S. Rowe Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law;
B.A., J.D., Yale University. I wish to thank Professor Blake Morant and Dean David Partlett
for their helpful comments, Michael Lestino for his able research assistance, and the Frances
Lewis Law Center at Washington and Lee for supporting this project.
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2 See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
3 E.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
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dramatically, yet the sources of the Court's intellectual divisions over free speech
are strangely elusive. A debate is in full force, but it is barely audible - or composed
in a hidden language. So the question is: Halfway through the first decade of a new
century, "Where do we find ourselves?"4 What accounts for the 7-2 split in McIntyre
v. Ohio Elections Commission,5 where a citizen successfully invoked the First Amend-
ment to avoid penalties for distributing anonymous handbills in violation of state
law? And what differences prompted the Court's 6-3 split in Bartnicki v. Vopper,6
where a radio host escaped liability for broadcasting an intercepted cell phone conver-
sation? Why did the Court divide 5-4 in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,7
where the majority upheld a judicial candidate's claim that state limitations on cam-
paign comments violated his freedom of speech? And did the differences in these
cases have any bearing on those in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, where
another 5-4 configuration upheld limitations on issue advocacy in federal campaigns?
Some might shrug off the questions, attributing disagreements on the Court to
ideology and isolating a "liberal" understanding of free speech and a "conservative"
rejoinder. But political tags are not necessarily illuminating in speech cases. Consider,
for example, Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston,
Inc.,9 where the Court ruled without dissent that a St. Patrick's Day parade is a "form
of expression"" and that private organizers have a First Amendment right to exclude
would-be participants who wish to convey a message (in that case, a message about
sexual orientation) different from the organizers' own. Ideology, sexual or other-
wise, seemed a non-factor. Still, even if Hurley confounds explanation-by-ideology,
what are we to make of the groupings of justices in the four cases before us -
McIntyre, Bartnicki, White, and McConnell? Justices considered left-of-center
tended to vote together in those cases, as did justices considered right-of-center, but
the significance of the groupings is murky at best. Neither bloc aligned consistently
with pro- or anti-speech results: Justices in the left-of-center bloc voted against the
speech-based challenges in McConnell and White, butfor speech-based challenges
in Bartnicki and McIntyre, and justices in the other bloc followed the opposite course
(although Justice Thomas deserted his bloc in McIntyre). Moreover, even within
4 RALPHWALDOEMERSON, Experience, in EMERSON'S ESSAYS 292,296(1926) (noting
that the "evanescence and lubricity of all objects, which lets them slip through our fingers
then when we clutch hardest, [is] the most unhandsome part of our condition"); Sheldon
Wolin, The Liberal/Democratic Divide, 24 POL. THEORY 97, 117 (1996) (reviewing JOHN
RAWLS, PoLrrICAL LIBERALISM (1993)).
1 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
6 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
7 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
1 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
9 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
10 id. at 568.
11 Id. at 573.
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blocs, justices often filed separate opinions. For example, Justice Breyer concurred
with the left-of-center justices in Bartnicki but on far narrower grounds, and Justice
Kennedy concurred with the right-of-center justices in White, but on far broader
grounds. And Justice O'Connor, after joining Justice Breyer's rationale in Bartnicki,
filed a concurrence with the right-of-center bloc in White before migrating to the
left-of-center bloc in McConnell.
Can doctrine explain what ideology cannot? Each of the four cases was a battle
over the meaning of precedent and the choice and application of legal tests, perhaps
illustrating Justice Scalia' s point that an abundance of doctrinal categories in First
Amendment jurisprudence has led to "disuniformity" of analysis, even to "ineffable"
calculations in individual cases. 12 But is doctrinal haggling the best explanation we
can venture for divisions in these cases? Surely that question points to the further
problem of what drives ajustice's choice of frameworks. For this, we must examine
what Ronald Dworkin has called the judge's sense of "some overall point orpurpose
to the Amendment's abstract guarantee of 'freedom of speech or of the press.'"13
This Article's premise is that at the heart of the cases is the "democratic partici-
pation" or "self-governance" value of the First Amendment. Although tradition
holds that four values underpin the guaranties of liberty of speech and press - self-
realization, truth-seeking, democratic participation, and social adaptability 4 -judges
most often invoke the third. Some aspects of the self-governance value are familiar.
Its political and moral premise is that "governments derive 'their just powers from
the consent of the governed""' 5 - that in a democracy the citizen is sovereign. Its
core assumptions about human nature are that individuals have the capacity to sort
through ideas and exchange views in a common reasoning process, and that they
grow and find fulfillment at least in part by involvement in public decisions, whether
as voter, candidate, demonstrator, discussant, or reader. The value's practical em-
bodiment is a legal rule: Citizens possess an enforceable right to speak openly about
political, social, and moral issues and to receive the perspectives of others without
inessential constraint. Judges have invoked this value in speech cases throughout
the nation's history, but beyond its familiar core, the value's meaning is unsettled.
This Article posits that the Court's recent divisions in speech cases are traceable
to differing elaborations of this value. Part I examines the value's most enduring
legal sources - colonial lawyer Andrew Hamilton's classic oration in the Zenger
12 Antonin Scalia, A House with Many Mansions: Categories of Speech Under the First
Amendment, in THE CONSTrrUTION, THE LAW, AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, 1787-1987, at
9, 18-19 (James Brewer Stewart ed., 1987).
13 Ronald Dworkin, The Coming Battles Over Free Speech, 39 N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS 55,
56 (1992) (reviewing ANTHONY LEwIS, MAKE No LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (1992)).
" See generally Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment,
72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963).
1" Id. at 883 (quoting THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE).
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trial, 6 and judicial opinions of Justices Louis D. Brandeis, 7 William J. Brennan,
Jr.,' 8 and Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 9 Although these writings emphasize different sub-
stantive dimensions of the value, they share a focus on respecting the individualism
of the citizen by strongly protecting expressive freedom. However, they give surpris-
ingly little attention to the participatory nature of citizenship, and they underappreciate
the role of speech in addressing the estrangement of citizens who have abandoned,
or suspect they have been abandoned by, politics.
The Article posits that a process account of the self-governance value would
address these gaps. Unlike the traditional substantive account, a process perspective
focuses on citizenship less as a mark of individualism and more as an interactive,
speech-driven dynamic in the setting of modern democracy. Even cases that gave
rise to the traditional model contain hints of a process approach on two analytic
tracks: first, on the level of society at large - as speech and press freedoms interact
to promote public-regarding thought and action - and second, on the level of the
citizen - as expressive freedoms enable the disengaged individual to respond in a
personal way to the call of public questions.
Parts H and I develop these two tracks by turning outside the law to highly
relevant sources of insight: political philosophy and world literature. First, in prob-
ing the contours of the primary, society-wide speech process, the Article incorpo-
rates new thinking on the political meaning of freedom, particularly the concepts of
negative and positive liberties. Building on Isaiah Berlin's famous treatment of this
seeming dichotomy,2' Maria Dimova-Cookson has conceptualized the two forms of
liberty as aspects of a dialectic of citizenship, defined as moral agency.2' Part II
seeks to harmonize her account of "liberty writ large" and the law's own implicit
process account of speech.
Then, to explore a secondary speech process, centered in the realm of individual
civic consciousness, Part 1II compares three versions of a literary treatment of citizen-
ship, alienation, and the (sometimes) saving dynamic of language: the classical story
of the Greek warrior Philoctetes, who in the bitter aftermath of abandonment by his
countrymen faces a decision about whether to rejoin them in the taking of Troy.
The Article considers the story's ancient treatment by Sophocles22 and subsequent
16 In 1735, Hamilton represented printer John Peter Zenger in the famous New York trial.
See JAMES ALEXANDER, A BRiEF NARRATvE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER,
PRINTER OF THE NEW YORK WEEKLY JOURNAL (Stanley Nider Katz ed., 1963) (1736).
'7 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372-80 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
1S N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256-92 (1964).
'9 Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850-75 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting).
20 IsAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts ofLiberty, in FOURESSAYSONLBERTY 118 (1969) [here-
inafter BERLIN, Two Concepts].
2 Maria Dimova-Cookson, A New Scheme of Positive and Negative Freedom: Recon-
structing T.H. Green on Freedom, 31 POL. THEORY 508 (2003).
22 SOPHOCLES, PHILOCTETES, in GREEK DRAMA 151 (Moses Hadas ed., R.C. Jebb trans.,
Bantam Classic ed., 1982) (1965).
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versions in our time by poet/dramatist Seamus Heaney, who saw in it a lesson relevant
to the cycle of bloodshed and distrust in Ireland,23 and British novelist Paul Scott,
who invoked the story to enlarge his chronicle of India's separation from Britain.24
In each, language plays a central role in the partial healing of the outsider and in the
complex progress of the larger social unit. The narratives suggest at least three
elements of a speech process related to self-governance: a systemic element, in which
law establishes fundamental conditions for freedom of speech in public life; a com-
munal element, in which law protects a largely unhindered flow of information to
provide connective tissue among citizens; and an identity-forming element, in which
law immunizes the expression of citizens as they seek secure footing in both public
and private aspects of their lives. For some citizens, the speech process will culmi-
nate in a life as much concerned with action as with dialogue - deeds in the public
interest flowing from conversation about it.
Part IV circles back to the quartet of cases that began the inquiry and to the
original question: What divides the justices in recent First Amendment cases? The
Article proposes that the justices are implicitly working toward a process account
of the self-governance value and that they differ in gauging how speech affects the
undertaking of moral agency. In an era of ingrained skepticism about political life,
moral agency ultimately relates to the formation and development of a civic role,
understood as a concept of self-giving with surprising effects for the citizen: the dis-
covery of a renewed public commitment, on the one hand, which amounts, on the
other, to a complex form of individual growth.
I. THE SUBSTANTIVE ACCOUNT OF THE SELF-GOVERNANCE VALUE
A. The Traditional Model
Before considering the potential contributions of a process account of the self-
governance value of speech, we consider the traditional substantive account. From
colonial times to the present, legal thinkers have stressed different aspects of civic
personality that expressive liberty advances. The vivid declarations of these thinkers
have breathed rhetorical life into the concept of expressive liberty and have pro-
duced strong intellectual foundations for specific legal rules.
Each of the four voices examined in Part L.A emphasizes a distinct dimension
of speech as it relates to the person-within-the state: speech as a shield against tyranny;
speech as a component of the democratic self; speech as a sign of dignity, defined
as one's claim to full membership in society; and speech as an instrument of political
control. Although these elements of the traditional account create a composite portrait
23 SEAMUS HEANEY, THE CURE AT TROY: A VERSION OF SOPHOCLES' PHILOCTETES (The
Noonday Press 1991) (1990).
24 PAUL ScoTT, THE RAJ QUARTET (3d prtg. 1978).
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of the individual as we would like to imagine her in contemporary democratic
society, the portrait is arguably incomplete. Lacking the dimension of the interactive
dynamic and moral responsibility of citizenship, the traditional account leaves doubts
about how well it captures political life as actually lived.
1. Self-Preservation
The definition of speech values began with lawyers, and one of the earliest expo-
nents on our soil was a Philadelphian, Andrew Hamilton. Forty years before the
Revolutionary War, Hamilton famously substituted for John Peter Zenger's dis-
barred attorneys and defended the New York printer against a charge of seditious
libel.25 In a remarkable argument to bench and jury, Hamilton addressed the citizen's
freedom to speak out about "the conduct of men in power,"26 drawing on a range of
sources to justify a finding of not guilty. 27 Although the case arose in a monarchal
colonial society,28 and Hamilton's address was not a direct call for democratic self-
rule, his articulation of the "right[] and privilege[] '29 to use truthful, hard-hitting,
defamatory speech concerning official conduct was an important step in the sub-
stantive development of the self-governance value of speech.
Hamilton began with theory - natural law - although he did not linger there.
He declared that "the right of complaining or remonstrating" men in power for unjust
acts is a "natural right,"3 ° and that denial of the freedom to voice truthful complaints
about "the conduct of men in power" produces a form of slavery.3 He argued:
[I]t is natural, it is a privilege, I will go farther, it is a right which
all freemen claim.., they have a right publicly to remonstrate
the abuses of power in the strongest terms, to put their neighbors
upon their guard against the craft or open violence of men in
25 Lincoln Barnett, The Case of John Peter Zenger, AM. HERITAGE, Dec. 1971, at 33, 34
(recounting details of Zenger trial, including disbarment of his attorneys for challenging the
authority of the presiding judges to hear the case).
26 ALEXANDER, supra note 16, at 87 (quoting Hamilton in his argument to the court).
27 Hamilton was "perhaps the best legal mind in America." Barnett, supra note 25, at 39.
A "former attorney general of Philadelphia, former speaker of the Pennsylvania assembly,
former vice-admiralty judge, a member of London's Gray's Inn, an independent in politics
and religion, and versatile enough to have been one of the architects of Independence Hall,"
Hamilton "'had art, eloquence, vivacity, and humor, was ambitious of fame, negligent of
nothing to ensure success, and possessed a confidence which no terrors could awe."' Id. (quot-
ing the son of a Zenger associate).
28 GORDON S. WOOD, THERADICALISM OFTHEAMERICAN REVOLUTION 11 (Vintage Books
1993) (1991).
29 ALEXANDER, supra note 16, at 83 (quoting Hamilton).
30 Id. at 84.
"' Id. at 87.
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authority, and to assert with courage the sense they have of the
blessings of liberty, the value they put upon it, and their resolu-
tion at all hazards to preserve it as one of the greatest blessings
heaven can bestow.32
This argument reflected background beliefs, arising in the British Enlightenment and
prevalent both at home and in the colonies,33 that human reason possessed the
capacity to know itself and the universe,34 and that individual conscience was well-
equipped to judge the rightness of governmental conduct.3 5 But natural law assertions,
then as now, have a way of losing steam,36 and Hamilton quickly moved on, turning
to the historical evidence of society's protection of critical public utterance. He
reminded the court of the demise of the Star Chamber, the "spirit of liberty" of the
Glorious Revolution of 1688-89,37 and the political liberty at the heart of the British
Constitution.38 Against this backdrop of evolving freedom, Hamilton portrayed
Zenger's prosecution as an example of arbitrary state power,3 9 comparable to the
political tyranny that radical Whigs were protesting in England. Swift to condemn
the king's ministers for inflicting real or imagined harms on liberties secured by the
32 Id. at 81. Professor Emerson notes that "freedom of discussion in public affairs serves
an important function regardless of whether the political structure of a nation is democratic
or not." Emerson, supra note 14, at 883.
33 CARL L. BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF
POLITICAL IDEAS 27 (Vintage Books 1959) (1942).
34 Id. at 41. See also RALPH KETCHAM, FRAMED FOR POSTERITY: THE ENDURING PHiLO-
SOPHYOFTHECONSTrrUTION22 (1993) (describing the Enlightenment, particularly seventeenth-
century scientists who in deploying the scientific method "presumed they could thus under-
stand and explain the entire physical universe").
35 BECKER, supra note 33, at 62. Ketcham describes natural law as associated with religious
thought by some, and with secular philosophy by others. KETCHAM, supra note 34, at 13.
36 As John Hart Ely put it, "The advantage... is that you can invoke natural law to
support anything you want. The disadvantage is that everybody understands that." JOHN HART
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JuDICIAL REVIEw 50 (1980).
" ALEXANDER, supra note 16, at 90 (quoting Hamilton). See KETCHAM, supra note 34,
at 8. Ketcham noted:
The great "settlements" that attended the Glorious Revolution (1688),
the oath of the king to "govern ... according to the statutes of Parlia-
ment agreed on and the laws and customs of the same," the Bill of Rights,
and the Toleration Act all emphasized the idea of a fixed if unwritten
constitution to which all branches of government would conform.
Id. (omission in original).
38 ALEXANDER, supra note 16, at 80 (quoting Hamilton); BERNARD BAILYN, THEORIGINS
OF AMERICAN POLITCS 53 (Vintage Books 1970) (1968) (noting that "[t]he veneration of the
British constitution, defined as mixed government precisely as it was in England, was a
commonplace in America from the earliest years of the eighteenth century."); WOOD, supra
note 28, at 13 (noting that "[a]lthough few Englishmen and no Englishwomen could vote for
representatives, they always had the sense of participating in political affairs.").
39 ALEXANDER, supra note 16, at 99 (quoting Hamilton).
12572006]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
Glorious Revolution, the Whigs insisted that the diffusion of power in English society
was insufficient. 4° Arguing in this tradition, Hamilton stressed that the underlying
value of speech was self-protection from tyranny.4' Speech was a shield "against the
arbitrary demands and illegal impositions of the times in which [citizens] lived. 42
At the same time, Hamilton implied that speech served to strengthen the social
ethic. When citizens criticize unjust acts of rulers, he argued, they advance the cause
of "common justice" and thus seek to "prevent the destruction of their fellow sub-
jects."'43 And not only did speech have a public value in this sense, it was also a ve-
hicle for collective self-definition. When Hamilton asked the court why the English
law of seditious libel should apply in the colonies, his point was that the colonists
- "borderland people," in Bernard Bailyn's phrase," with native-born goals and
values - would find a framework of their own for regulating debate.45 Speech and
press in the New World would have social importance beyond that of the English
experience.
Hamilton, however, fell short of an account of speech as self-governance. These
intimations aside, he did not address speech as an everyday instrument for building
a society with other citizens, and he demanded a rule that would immunize only prov-
ably truthful facts. Although in colonial politics he was a force for structural change,
particularly for a strengthened legislative body,' his oration in Zenger did not cast
40 WOOD, supra note 28, at 18, 22.
41 See David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REv. 455,491
(1983); Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in FirstAmendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 521, 528-38.
42 ALEXANDER, supra note 16, at 98 (quoting Hamilton).
41 Id. at 80 (quoting Hamilton). Note, too, Hamilton's reference, already quoted, to the
citizen's effort, through speech, "to put their neighbors upon their guard against the craft or
open violence of men in authority." Id. at 81 (quoting Hamilton).
44 BERNARD BAILYN, To BEGIN THE WORLD ANEw: THE GENIus AND AMBIGUITIES OF
THE AMERICAN FOUNDERS 8 (2003).
45 See KETCHAM, supra note 34, at 22. Ketcham noted that the Enlightenment involved
a resolute search for new facts and new principles that would propel the
rational progress of humankind to previously unknown heights. Euro-
pean settlers in North America not only took this outlook with them to
the New World ... but once there they found an environment unsuited
to rigid orthodoxies but welcoming to the new, the untried, and the un-
formed.
Id. For analysis of a twentieth-century example of viewing politics as "the pursuit of...
intimations," in the sense of a playing out of tradition that does not point in a single direction,
see PAUL FRANCO, MICHAEL OAKESHOTr: AN INTRODUCTION 94-99 (2004) (noting that for
Oakeshott, "every tradition contains within itself a multiplicity of different, and sometimes
colliding, intimations.").
46 BURTON ALVA KONKLE, THE LIFE OF ANDREW HAMILTON 1676-1741: "THE DAY-
STAR OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION" 117-18 (1941) (detailing Hamilton's role in strength-
ening the Pennsylvania House of Representatives in 1737).
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speech as a form of non-defensive participation or fulfillment of duty. A more
expansive account of speech's place in the social ethic would require grounding in
popular sovereignty, not natural law, and it would trace a clearer line between per-
sonal and public effects of expressive liberty. Hamilton focused on individuality
and self-protective expression, and although he mentioned the public benefits of
speech and the joint quest to attain them, he offered little indication of how the two
aspects of speech might intersect.
Of course, his main goal was to win the case. Soon after Hamilton concluded,
the jury members whom he had urged "to see with their own eyes, to hear with their
own ears, and to make use of their own consciences and understandings in judging
of the lives, liberties or estates of their fellow subjects, 47 acquitted Zenger. The
jury's verdict modeled the action extolled by Hamilton: individual mind brought
to collegial decision-making. The court did not disturb the verdict.
Hamilton's oration went through fourteen printings before 1791; one scholar
calls it "the most widely known source of libertarian thought in England and America
during the eighteenth century. ''48 Its principal theme, that the citizen possesses a wide
scope of liberty to question, criticize, even humiliate, public officials, envisioned one
form of power - state power that "bears down all before it and brings destruction
and desolation wherever it comes"49 - in conflict with another form, the shielding
force of accusatory speech. Hamilton thus provided a crucial first element of the
substance of what would become the self-governance value, a considerable achieve-
ment in 1735.
2. Tolerance
In contrast, sovereignty was at the heart of Justice Louis D. Brandeis's concur-
rence in Whitney v. California,50 a second leading statement on the value of speech.
Written at the end of the First Amendment's first decade as a modern legal concept,
the concurrence may be "the most important essay ever written, on or off the bench, on
the meaning of the first amendment."' While Hamilton's oration had sprung from a na-
tural rights orientation and presaged American Revolutionary thought, Justice Brandeis's
concurrence invoked "[t]hose who won our independence" 2 and reflected on their
accomplishment: the concept of citizen sovereignty as the basis of government. Ten
47 ALEXANDER, supra note 16, at 93 (quoting Hamilton).
48 LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 130 (1985).
4' ALEXANDER, supra note 16, at 98 (quoting Hamilton).
50 274 U.S. 357, 372-80 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
51 Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage: The Brandeis
Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv. 653, 668 (1988). Dean Smolla
praises the opinion as "one of the great majestic stirring tributes to freedom of expression."
RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 106 (Vintage Books 1993) (1992).
52 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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years before Whitney, Judge Learned Hand in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten53 had
written that the "right to criticise" government actions is "the privilege of the
individual in countries dependent upon the free expression of opinion as the ultimate
source of authority."54 Brandeis gave lasting voice to Hand's theme.
Whitney addressed the constitutionality of a criminal conviction under a state
sedition law enacted in 1919, as the frenzy generated by the Russian Revolution be-
came the Red Scare.55 Whitney had assisted the organization of the Communist Labor
Party of California and thus was part of a group that advocated "the desirability of
a proletarian revolution by mass action at some date necessarily far in the future."56
As Brandeis put it, "[T]he accused is to be punished, not for contempt, incitement or
conspiracy, but for a step in preparation, which, if it threatens the public order at
all, does so only remotely.",57 Brandeis could not agree with the Court's majority
that Whitney's participation was beyond the protection of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. 8
The stature of Brandeis's opinion comes from the sheer force of its language,
ideas, and doctrine. First, Brandeis's arresting style exemplified the power of speech
to capture the complexities of political life. In compelling cadence, he faulted political
complacency: "[T]he greatest menace to freedom," he wrote, "is an inert people .... 59
He praised expressive participation in self-rule, extolling "[t]hose who won our in-
dependence" for their convictions "that public discussion is a political duty" and that
"silence coerced by law" is unacceptable.' Second, Brandeis brought ideas to First
Amendment adjudication, particularly specifications of values driving the concepts
of speech and press, including self-development, the search for truth, and democratic
51 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
14 Id. at 539. On the Masses case and Judge Hand's communications with Justice Holmes
about the proper scope of the First Amendment under the Espionage Acts of the World War I
period, see Louis MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB 426-31 (2001).
11 ROBERT A. BURT, TWO JEWISH JUSTICES: OUTCASTS IN THE PROMISED LAND 114
(1988); GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 237-38 (2004).
56 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 379 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
57 Id. at 373.
" Id. at 379. Brandeis, however, concurred in the conviction on grounds that the state had
presented evidence of conspiracy, by members of another organization, to commit serious
present crimes, and had shown that Whitney's own organization was involved. Id. Smolla
strongly criticizes Brandeis for not dissenting. SMOLLA, supra note 51, at 105-06.
5 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
I ld. at 375-76. Declaring that "[flear of serious injury cannot alonejustify suppression
of free speech and assembly," Brandeis noted that "[m]en feared witches and burnt women,"
id. at 376, echoing John Stuart Mill's statement in On Liberty that man's "servility" to masters
and gods "gives rise to perfectly genuine sentiments of abhorrence; it made men burn magi-
cians and heretics," JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY & THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN 10
(Wordsworth Classics 1996) (1859).
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participation. 6' He thus recognized the "intensely individualist[ic] 62 role of speech
and its necessity to the "good citizen., 63 Finally, he sketched a doctrinal framework,
a test of whether governmental action constrains more speech than is demonstrably
necessary.' 4 The influence of the Whitney concurrence has been considerable.65
Brandeis had more in mind, however, and his opinion suffered from a compe-
tition of ideas. As noted, one goal was to affirm the centrality of the citizen, whose
liberty of thought he pronounced "indispensable to the discovery and spread of polit-
ical truth. ' '66 In later passages, however, he shifted focus from reasons supporting a
speaker's freedom to reasons commanding tolerance among those in power. Professor
Blasi has argued that Brandeis's ultimate interest in Whitney was just this - the
spread of tolerance. According to Blasi, Brandeis sought to extol civic courage -
not the courage of dissenters to test a majority's views, but the courage of receivers
of unpopular speech to develop "a healthy mentality regarding change." 67 Thus, in
urging First Amendment-based protection for the "thought, hope and imagination"
of dissidents, Brandeis's point was that "[i]f the marginal, powerless members of the
community retain some semblance of spirit, the mainstream is more likely to sustain
its own vitality. '6' Blasi hails Brandeis for espousing the view that the essence of
the self-governance value is "its contribution to the character of the political com-
munity, particularly the character of those who possess the power to regulate."' This
conclusion comports with a more general aspiration of Brandeis: that he "would strive
to interpret [the] outsider's needs and concerns to the insiders of the day, to dissolve
social boundaries by inspiring sympathy and fellow feeling on both sides. 70
However, Brandeis's shift in focus ultimately marred his most famous opinion.
By stressing that the value of expressive liberty depends primarily on the good it
does for the character of the powerful, Brandeis diverged from his initial concern,
the value of speech as the citizen's engine of critical thought about society and his
place (or lack of place) in it. If Brandeis's main subject was tolerance, he missed
the chance to probe the complex effects of the tolerated activity on the citizen, espe-
cially the citizen who is at odds with mainstream society and wounded by anger or
isolation. More broadly, if the practices of citizenship are regarded negatively as
activities obliging tolerance, rather than positively as activities embodying the nation's
61 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
62 BURT, supra note 55, at 11.
63 Id. at 14.
64 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 376 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (stating that "[iln order to support
a finding of clear and present danger it must be shown either that immediate serious violence
was to be expected or was advocated, or that the past conduct furnished reason to believe that
such advocacy was then contemplated").
65 Blasi, supra note 51, at 682-83.
66 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
67 Blasi, supra note 51, at 691.
68 Id. at 676 (emphasis added).
69 Id. at 679-80.
7 BURT, supra note 55, at 87.
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commitment to self-governance, it is hard to see how the law's guaranties can remain
vital. Like lawyer Hamilton's emphasis on self-preservation, Brandeis's focus on
the equanimity of the powerful arguably left his account incomplete.
3. Dignity
Forty years after Whitney, the Court's decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
7 1
cast additional light on the self-governance value of speech. At issue was a fund-
raising advertisement that listed brutalities suffered by civil rights demonstrators at
the hands of Alabama police in the late 1950s.72 A state police commissioner, using
the strict liability action for libel, sued the New York Times for running the adver-
tisement, which included, among other misstatements, an erroneous charge that
police had tried to starve protesting students by padlocking a university cafeteria.
7 3
The police commissioner also sued four black clerics whose names appeared on the
advertisement as sponsors. After the commissioner prevailed in the state courts, the
issue in the U.S. Supreme Court was whether the libel tort met the dictates of the
speech and press clauses of the First Amendment. Writing for the Court, Justice
Brennan likened the tort to the infamous Sedition Act of 179874 and identified "the
central meaning of the First Amendment" with James Madison's statement that "the
censorial power is in the people over the Government, and not in the Government
over the people. '75 The Court surmised that speakers facing the prospect of strict
liability for false, defamatory statements would steer clear of public speech, including
comments that they believed to be true but not provably SO. 76 The Court, therefore,
required that a public official suing a citizen-critic prove clearly and convincingly
that the published statement was false and that the speaker either knew it was false
or had serious doubts about its truth.7 7 The majority declined to follow a bolder argu-
ment that the First Amendment absolutely forbids any sort of libel action brought
by a public official against a critical speaker.78
The Sullivan decision followed Brandeis in grounding First Amendment freedoms
in popular sovereignty. Yet Justice Brennan departed from Brandeis's focus on
71 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
72 Id. at 257-58.
71 Id. at 259.
74 Id. at 273.
71 Id. at 273-74, 282.
76 Id. at 278 (stating that in a strict liability regime, "the pall of fear and timidity imposed
upon those who would give voice to public criticism is an atmosphere in which the First
Amendment freedoms cannot survive").
77 Id. at 279-80 (formulating "actual malice" test).
78 See id. at 293-97 (Black, J., concurring); id. at 297-305 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
79 The opinion earned contemporaneous praise as "the best and most important [opinion]
ever produced in the realm of freedom of speech." Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times
Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the FirstAmendment", 1964 SuP. CT. REV. 191, 194.
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tolerance among those in power; the civil rights context of the case suggested that
more immediate First Amendment goals were more pressing. For Brennan, the self-
governance value underscored the importance of autonomy of citizen-critics (here,
the press and the black clerics) to speak, and of others in the public to hear,' con-
sistent with the nation's "profound... commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."'"
Underlying Brennan's approach was an emphasis on the dignity of the citizen.
In a subsequent libel case, Herbert v. Lando,2 after quoting Brandeis's statement
that "'[t]hose who won our independence... valued liberty both as an end and as
a means,"' 83 Brennan wrote:
Freedom of speech is itself an end because the human community
is in large measure defined through speech; freedom of speech is
therefore intrinsic to individual dignity. This is particularly so in
a democracy like our own, in which the autonomy of each indi-
vidual is accorded equal and incommensurate respect.'
Here Brennan echoed the writings of political thinker Alexander Meiklejohn.85 In
the years before Sullivan, Meiklejohn had urged a theory of self-governance for
speech cases, arguing that "freedom to govern... implies and requires what we call
'the dignity of the individual.' Self-government can exist only insofar as the voters
acquire the intelligence, integrity, sensitivity, and generous devotion to the general
welfare that, in theory, casting a ballot is assumed to express."86 Invoking "the dignity
of a governing citizen, 8 7 Meiklejohn argued that the First Amendment should abso-
lutely prohibit libel suits brought against speakers for attacking the fitness of public
candidates.88
In non-judicial writings twenty years after Sullivan, Justice Brennan took up
Meiklejohn's theme and explicitly identified "the essential dignity and worth of each
80 "'It is a prized American privilege to speak one's mind, although not always with perfect
good taste, on all public institutions.... ."' Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269 (alteration in original)
(quoting Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941)).
8' Id. at 270.
82 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
83 Id. at 183 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part) (alteration and omission in original) (quoting
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
' Id. at 183 n.1.
81 See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., Comment, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn
Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1965).
86 Alexander Meiklejohn, The FirstAmendmentIs anAbsolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REv. 245,
255.
87 Id. at 257.
88 Id. at 259.
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individual" as the lynchpin of American citizenship. 89 He stated that "[r]ecognition
of broad and deep rights of expression and of conscience reaffirm the vision of
human dignity" by facilitating public debate and encouraging the development of
political convictions.' "The constitutional vision of human dignity," Brennan
wrote, "rejects the possibility of political orthodoxy imposed from above; it respects
the rights of each individual to form and to express political judgments, however far
they may deviate from the mainstream and however unsettling they might be to the
powerful or the elite."9' Brennan's notion of dignity exerted profound influence on
the decisions of the Supreme Court as later justices took up the theme of autonomy
and its implications for diverse areas of law.92
However, even a concept of dignity is limited as a touchstone for the self-
governance value of speech. The self of Brennan's model is an autonomous agent.
To be sure, the model's premises are salutary: the agent merits respect, based as much
on the agent's potential to engage in self-determination as on her actual achievement
of identity, and free expression embodies one aspect of the respect accorded by the
Constitution. But over-emphasizing the political and moral independence of the
person can lead to a view of the person as removed from others - free, self-deter-
mining, yet a separate soul, living in isolation. Even though Brennan contemplates
encounters among citizens through "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" speech,93
his adjectives suggest the risk of people speaking past each other. In this way,
democratic consciousness can suffer slippage: from dialogue based on equal respect
to potentially uncompromising debate among subjects who view each other warily
from havens of walled-off "dignity." The problem is that an exclusive focus on
dignity can impede interactive dialogue among citizens who presumptively make
room for each other's speech and attempt to engage it. Stephen K. White, consider-
ing contemporary liberalism's core value of respect for others, raises a similar question
about the range of openness and receptivity to others that a dignity-based understanding
of democracy, by itself, can be expected to produce.94 White suggests that a dignity
model can breed "wariness, self-protection, and uneasiness" among citizens as they
89 William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion, and "The Progress of Law", 10 CARDOZO
L. REV. 3, 15 (1988).
90 William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratifi-
cation, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433, 442-43 (1986).
91 Id.
92 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (sexuality); Hurley v. Irish-American
Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995) (speech); Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (abortion).
93 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
94 STEPHEN K. WRIrrE, SUSTAINING AFFIRMATION: THE STRENGTHS OF WEAK ONTOLOGY
IN POLITICAL THEORY 146-49 (2000) (discussing theorist William Connolly's critique of
political liberalism as providing insufficient moral motivation for an ethic of receptivity to
new groups trying to enter a democratic culture's political mainstream).
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encounter emerging voices in a democratic culture.95 The dignity model of self-
governance, despite its obvious merit in emphasizing equal rights, is thus incomplete
insofar as it omits reflection on the nature of participation itself. It stresses the
dignity that is the basis of the right, rather than a dignity that could flow from its
exercise.
4. Control
A fourth substantive strand of the self-governance value - the value of speech
as an instrument of democratic control - achieved prominence through the decisions
of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Like Justices Brandeis and Brennan, Justice Powell
began with popular sovereignty. In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,
Inc., he reiterated the primacy of "'meaningful dialogue of ideas concerning self-
government,' ,96 and in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., he affirmed Sullivan's point that
"we protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that matters. 97 However, the
similarities ended there. Brandeis and Brennan viewed speech as related to civic
being: for Brandeis, speech was integral to human personality, and for Brennan,
going the next step, speech was integral to human dignity, a sign of membership in
society. Powell, on the other hand, focused on speech as an instrument of civic action:
Speech enabled. But Powell saw that many other attributes of personality impart an
enabling capacity, and in cases where other attributes, like reputation or privacy,
clashed with speech, Powell strove to accord each of them the weight commanded
by common sense and tradition. His approach resembled Andrew Hamilton's emphasis
in Zenger, viewing speech as a means - for Powell, one of many - to a civic end.
Powell's approach was most visible in Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., where news
reporters challenged the constitutionality of a Federal Bureau of Prisons rule pro-
hibiting press-initiated interviews of prisoners. 98 A majority of the Court found no
First Amendment issue to consider, reasoning that the rule was "no more than a
particularized application of the general rule that nobody may enter the prison and
designate an inmate whom he would like to visit, unless the prospective visitor is a
lawyer, clergyman, relative, or friend of that inmate." 99 In a dissent joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall and later cited by Justice Brennan,'0° Justice Powell invoked
" Id. at 148. See also Stephen K. White, Three Conceptions of the Political: The Real
World of Late Modem Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND VISION: SHELDON WOUN AND THE
VICISSIUDES OF THE POLTCAL 173, 187-88 (AryehBotwinick & William E. Connolly eds.,
2001) [hereinafter DEMOCRACY AND VISION].
96 472 U.S. 749, 760 (1985) (plurality opinion) (quoting Harley-Davidson Motorsports,
Inc. v. Markley, 568 P.2d 1359, 1363 (Ore. 1977)).
97 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974).
98 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
99 Id. at 849.
"o E.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,587 n.3 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
concurring injudgment); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 189 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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"the societal function of the First Amendment in preserving free public discussion
of governmental affairs."' O' Noting that "the press performs a crucial function in
effecting the societal purpose of the First Amendment" by "enabling the public to
assert meaningful control over the political process,"' °2 Powell equated the right of
control with the people's prerogative "to consider and resolve their own destiny."'0 3
However, a broad statement of the self-governance value did not lead Powell to
agree that reporters had a right of access to inmates of their choice (even though the
record of the case signaled the necessity of inmate interviews for adequate news cover-
age of prisons). 14 Rather, he resisted "chasing the right-of-access rainbows that an
advocate's eye can spot in virtually all governmental actions," and framed the issue
as whether the government regulation would have a "palpable impact on the under-
lying right of the public to the information needed to assert ultimate control over the
political process."'0 5 He reasoned that although the Bureau's flat ban was overbroad,
the case-by-case approach desired by reporters was simply not necessary to ensure
"ultimate control" by citizens "over the political process." Powell showed sympathy
for an intermediate rule permitting some access to inmates but not requiring individ-
ualized consideration of all requests." 6
Powell's concept of the self-governance value of speech as the capacity to "resolve
one's destiny" and thus assert "ultimate control over the political process" would
have widened the freedoms of press and speech beyond what the Saxbe majority was
willing to consider. Moreover, Powell's legal framework was more generous to speech
and press interests than what the Court later devised in Richmond Newspapers'0 7 and
other access cases.'08 Focusing in Saxbe almost entirely on functional arguments,
Powell paid little heed to the prison setting's lack of historical openness. At the same
time, however, the "control" model generated a legal rule of only limited reach. Not
O' Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 862 (Powell, J., dissenting).
io2 Id. at 863.
103 Id. at 862.
4 Id. at 872.
105 Id.
"06 Id. at 873-74. For a brief but incisive account of Justice Powell's approach to adjudi-
cation in a "profoundly polarized" legal culture, particularly his effort to reach "Solomonic
results" through decisions "that honored the legitimacy of two opposing positions and that
sought to ensure that the adjudicatory losers did not leave court feeling disenfranchised and
abandoned by the legal system," see J. Harvie Wilkinson HI, The Powellian Virtues in a
PolarizedAge, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 271,271-273 (1992). "For Powell, compromise was
not only a necessary feature of a collegial institution; it was a desirable response to a plural-
istic society." JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 561 (1994).
107 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (finding that the First Amendment guarantees the press and public
a qualified right of access to criminal trials).
" E.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (finding that the First
Amendment guarantees the press and public a qualified right of access to preliminary hearings
in California criminal cases); Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (find-
ing a First Amendment-based, qualified right of access to jury selection proceedings in cri-
minal cases).
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many government actions, it seems, can deprive citizens of "ultimate control" over
the political process. "Control" analysis suggests that a constraint of First Amendment
liberties will survive as long as it serves a reasonable end, has a meaningful connection
to that end, and does not preclude citizens from otherwise speaking out. Powell's
moderate solution in Saxbe thus resembled the proffered rule in Zenger. As discussed
in Part I, Andrew Hamilton urged that the right to defame government authorities ex-
tended to provably true statements but not beyond, not even to innocently published
falsity. " In both cases, some level of "control" through speech was preserved - but
marginally. Whether defined in Powell's or Hamilton's terms, freedom of speech gen-
erated rules that preserved fundamental sovereignty but left considerable room for
restrictions."°
The control strand of self-governance, then, was a mixed proposition. Although
Powell's application of the concept was often sufficient to displace outdated doctrine,
his affinity for balancing allowed for small or maddeningly ambiguous change. More-
over, like Hamilton, Brandeis, and Brennan, he gave little indication of the relation-
ship between his framework and citizenship. If control is a principle of action, it is
not self-evidently dialogic in nature. And absent the collective force of dialogue,
it is hard to see how speech could amount to control in any strong sense.
The traditional model of the substantive account of self-governance thus combines
elements of survival (Hamilton), integrity (Brandeis), membership (Brennan), and
power (Powell). It imagines the citizen from perspectives of being and doing: the
inherent value of the person as a citizen relates to the second and third elements, and
the capacity for action affecting the world relates to the first and fourth. Expression
embodies the citizen's fundamental dignity as participant in public matters, and the
state's tolerance embodies its grasp and appreciation of that dignity. Freedoms of
speech and press also mark out a citizen's range of action, facilitating leverage over
the political process, and bolstering the individual's ability to resist state action when
necessary.
But questions remain. In regarding the citizen chiefly as an undivided con-
sciousness with interest and capacity to participate in public life, is the account ade-
quate to the complexities of political experience? To be sure, it places the citizen in a
109 See supra text accompanying notes 25-47.
"0 Powell's "control" approach figured prominently in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323 (1974). The question was whether the First Amendment requires that a non-public
figure establish actual malice in a libel case involving a matter of public concern. Id.
Powell's decision for the Court held that the First Amendment does not tolerate application
of the strict-liability tort, but that a Sullivan-like rule, saddling the plaintiff with the burden
of proving actual malice, would take constitutional requirements too far. Id. Powell settled
on an intermediate approach, as in Saxbe: the plaintiff must prove negligence in order to
obtain damages for actual injury, and actual malice in order to receive presumed or punitive
damages. Id. In terms of "control," Gertz reserved for citizens "ultimate" (even if not very
expansive) control over their ability to receive news by freeing the media from strict liability
for reports about private figures enmeshed in public matters.
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value-laden context, and it acknowledges that the citizen encounters not only political
disagreement in that world but also impediments to participation, whether from the
prejudices of other citizens or restrictions of the state. However, the account remains
incomplete on at least two counts. First, it lacks a strong sense of the citizen as other
than an autonomous agent receiving information, dutifully making judgments in the
privacy of the mind, and tracing steps toward a voting booth on election day. Where
is the agent's "constructive engagement" '' with other citizens, the labor of finding
vocabularies of debate, compromise, or dissent, and the experience of using those
vocabularies with others to pursue visions of the good society? Second, the account
neglects the phenomenon of alienation, particularly the contemporary citizen's internal
conflicts over whether to engage in the social conversation at all. Think of certain
commonly-held perceptions of contemporary conditions: that the individual has no
more than minimal impact on major social decisions;". that mass media outlets,
owned by a diminishing number of powerful entities and seemingly resistant to local
input, dominate national debate;" 3 and that a modem democracy's reliance on a "high
degree of cohesion" to generate popular participation works against a philosophy of
tolerance, pushing instead "toward exclusion" of groups who are new to the majority
culture or who otherwise feel estranged from the way a state defines itself."4 Add to
these tensions the lessons framed by novelists that even democratic participants risk
becoming versions of the tyrannies they oppose, "5 and that those who dedicate them-
selves to civic duty can stumble into lives of illusion." 6 The traditional substantive
"' White, supra note 95, at 181.
12 Charles Taylor, The Dangers of Soft Despotism, in THE ESSENTIAL COMMUNITARIAN
READER 47, 47 (Amitai Etzioni ed., 1998) (citing "the familiar sense" that "[t]he average
citizen feels power to be at a great distance and frequently unresponsive to him or her").
"' Id. at 47-48 (noting that, due to media concentration, "[o]ther views, other ways of posing
[political] questions, other agendas cannot get a hearing").
114 Charles Taylor, A Tension in Modem Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND VISION, supra note
95, at 79, 81.
"' For example, in The Plague, Albert Camus depicts a rampant epidemic and the range
of characters that face the question of whether to flee or to assist in caring for victims and
setting up quarantines. One character, Tarrou, recalls other "plagues" that he had experienced
in his life. As a youth, he had witnessed his father, a prosecutor, furiously calling for the death
penalty in a criminal case. Tarrou rebelled and joined a political movement against capital
punishment. However, he encountered individuals within the movement who exhibited the
same pitiless, violent mentality he had seen in his father. Committing himself to peaceful
public service, Tarrou remained wary of the tendency of even well-intentioned, "innocent"
individuals to contribute to violence. ALBERT CAMUS, THE PLAGUE 229-30 (Stuart Gilbert
trans., 1948).
16 English novelist Kazuo Ishiguro writes of professional men and women who com-
pletely commit themselves to an ideal of public service but tragically fail to stamp the ideal
with an individual perspective and therefore become prisoner to it. E.g., KAZUO ISHIGURO,
WHEN WE WERE ORPHANS (Vintage Int'l 2001) (2000); KAZUO IHIGURO, THE REMAINS OF
THE DAY (Vintage Int'l 2003) (1988).
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account of the self-governance value arguably neglects these problems of democratic
consciousness, omitting treatment of the citizen as a participant humanly struggling
with a system, with political ideas, with anxieties of disagreement, and with the com-
plexity of language."'
B. New Versions
Recent commentaries by J.M. Balkin ' l8 and Cass Sunstein 19 attempt to steer the
substantive account in new directions. Focusing on the role and impact of the Internet,
these scholars ground expressive freedoms in a world of ever-increasing techno-
logical possibilities.
1. Cultural Production
Balkin urges that we stop thinking of the value of speech in the "far too limited"
sense of "government and democratic deliberation,"' 20 and that we broaden the con-
cept considerably to focus on "'culture' ... the collective process of meaning-making
in a society.' ' .21 As he puts it, "If free speech is about democracy, it is about democ-
racy in the widest possible sense, not merely at the level of governance, or at the level
of deliberation, but at the level of culture." 22 Balkin refers to ordinary citizens who,
if certain intellectual property rules fall to the First Amendment, could deploy Internet
technology to appropriate a range of materials for cultural commentary.'23 The con-
sistency of intellectual property law with the First Amendment is a problem well
worth addressing, 124 but why should its answer require displacing the self-governance
value as the driving force of the First Amendment? Besides raising questions of
necessity, the turn from self-governance to "cultural production" promises little for
"' The traditional substantive account thus lacks the nuance of Stephen Macedo's under-
standing of liberalism. Macedo recognizes the value of "'situated autonomy"' and notes that
"[1]iberal autonomy is not a matter of transcending contingency or of inhabiting a world
beyond our own; it is not a matter of standing outside one's community.... The autonomous
individual is a socially embedded individual .... " STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES:
CITIZENSHIP, VIRTUE, AND COMMUNITY IN LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 216,218-19 (1990).
"' Jack M. Balkin, Commentary, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of
Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2004).
"9 CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUiBLIC.COM (2001).
120 Balkin, supra note 118, at 34.
121 Id. at 36.
122 Id. at 34.
123 Id. at 1.
124 Balkin is highly critical of the Supreme Court's decision in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.
186 (2003) (upholding Copyright Term Extension Act). The Court, in his view, failed to recog-
nize "that ever-expanding property rights in patent, trademark, and copyright adversely affect
freedom of expression." Balkin, supra note 118, at 27 n.46.
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the invigoration of participation in specifically political affairs.'25 In fact, the argu-
ment that we should de-emphasize "government and democratic deliberation" and
thus cancel the symbolic primacy of specifically political speech as the constitutional
"core," may well result in a moral loss for the First Amendment, if citizens are led
to equate even mundane forms of "cultural production" with the demands and risks
of issue-oriented or election-oriented political participation. Particularly now, with
intense debate in this country over issues of war, peace, security, terror, and other
life-or-death issues, displacing the focus on self-governance with emphasis on "cultural
production" appears ill-timed, if not counter-productive.
2. Information Consumption
For Sunstein, an unregulated Internet offers no expressive panacea: the citizen
he describes is at bottom a consumer, enabled by Internet technology to retreat to
a chosen sanctuary of filtered news and information.'26 There the citizen can bypass
contact with other points of view and avoid all challenges to his own perspective,
which then risks turning ever more extreme. 127 Sunstein thus proposes a regulation
requiring "partisan" websites to provide links to opposing views. 128 Such a rule, he
argues, will enhance the citizen's store of information and thus his freedom to tran-
scend self-interest. However, it is hard to see how the rule would overcome the
obtuseness of the sanctuary-seeking citizen Sunstein describes, and ultimately both
the problem he portrays 29 and the solution he offers13 seem trivial. In the end, it
125 Compare Professor Hill's concern that "the broadening of the freedom of expression
has tended to diffuse it. As expression is channeled in other directions - to the pursuit of
the aesthetic, the hedonic, even the erotic - the expressive energies of society arguably are
scattered in a thousand different directions," neglecting political, social, and economic
realms of communal life. J.L. Hill, The Five Faces of Freedom in American Political and
Constitutional Thought, 45 B.C. L. REv. 499, 578 (2004).
126 SUNSTEIN, supra note 119, at 60 (noting that the internet threatens civic engagement
by enabling citizens to confine themselves to "more and louder echoes of their own voices").
127 Id. at 71. Citizens in effect create their own newspapers, "The Daily Me," servicing their
own interests and catering to their pre-formed political tastes.
128 Id. at 187.
129 "Sunstein forgets, or simply ignores, the real world, which will always impinge on media
choices and will always provide the public sidewalks that he fears will disappear in cyber-
space." Dan Hunter, Philippic.com, 90 CAL. L. REv. 611,640 (2002) (reviewing SuNSTEIN,
supra note 119).
130 Opining that Sunstein's proposal "begins looking a little foolish in the details," Professor
Hunter asks, "Who determines what website is the opposite of the partisan sites? How is this
enforced?" Id. at 667. Professor Powe notes that under a regulatory regime based on Sunstein's
plan, a website's choice of links could be manipulative, designed to show itself as "sweet
reasonableness incarnate" by providing links only to sites espousing positions at ideological
extremes. L.A. Powe, Jr., Disease and Cure?, 101 MICH. L. REv. 1947, 1958 (2003) (review-
ing SUNSTEIN, supra note 119).
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is unlikely that citizenship - defined as the habit of public-regarding involvement
in specifically political affairs - would be promoted by either the augmented negative
liberty sought by Balkin for his citizen of culture or the dubious positive liberty sought
by Sunstein for his citizen-consumer.
3. Toward a Process Approach
Robert Post suggests the basis of a different approach, a "'participatory' theory"
of the First Amendment.' 3' He contrasts a Meiklejohnian perspective, which he says
is concerned with "collective processes of decision making," 32 with a "participatory
perspective," which he considers dominant in First Amendment jurisprudence and
which aims to enable citizens to "experience their authorship of the state.' '133 In
Post's view, "a necessary precondition for this experience" is "that a state be struc-
tured so as to subordinate its actions to public opinion"; to this end, "a state [must]
be constitutionally prohibited from preventing its citizens from participating in the
communicative processes relevant to the formation of democratic public opinion.""4
By highlighting the experiential nature of citizenship and referencing "communi-
cative processes," Post points beyond existing thought on First Amendment values
and intimates a need to explore the operation of a speech process in a modern demo-
cracy. Perhaps the substantive account of the self-governance value can be supple-
mented by one that attends to the workings of unfettered speech on the civic education
and political maturation of citizens.
Others point this way as well. Justice Stephen Breyer's Madison Lecture in 2002
advocated an approach to constitutional adjudication centered on "active liberty," the
classical concept of "citizen participation in government.' ' 35 To advance participation,
courts following Breyer's lead would consciously focus on "real-world consequences"
- especially consequences for participation - of decisions interpreting the Constitu-
tion's guaranties of liberty. 36 A consequentialist approach, then, lends itself to
thinking about speech as a dynamic that, depending on its context and rules, can
either encourage or discourage citizens from joining the political conversation. For
Breyer, recognition of the importance of citizen participation requires a flexible ap-
proach to adjudication: a wise recognition in campaign finance reform cases, for ex-
ample, "that important First Amendment-related interests lie on both sides of the con-
stitutional equation."
131
131 Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88
CAL. L. REV. 2353, 2367 (2000).
132 Id.
133 Id. at 2368.
134 Id.
131 Stephen Breyer, Lecture, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 246
(2002).
136 Id. at 249.
37 Id. at 253.
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But what more would an experiential approach to the self-governance value of
speech entail? Two of the cases discussed earlier contain hints. In Whitney, Justice
Brandeis repeatedly considered "[t]hose who won our independence" and what
speech must have meant for them. 138 He listed lessons that the American colonists
learned about "fear," "repression," and "silence," lessons they could only have been
taught by first-hand experience. 139 Then he pointed to what they ultimately "valued,"
"believed," "recognized," and "knew" about liberty,"0 particularly liberty of speech,
and finally to the action they ultimately pursued: "independence by revolution.''
In effect, something happened between the experience of "fear" and the advent of
"knowledge." Brandeis's logic appears to be that, during this interval, the bedraggled
colonists discovered the saving significance of expression for their shared identity as
seekers of independence and self-rule. But Brandeis did not elaborate on the full
nature of the experience of mental change.
Similarly, Brennan's opinion in Sullivan contains hints of a speech process.
According to his opinion, the Times and the clerics required freedom from the chill-
ing effect of the common law in order to trigger "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open"
speech among citizens at large.'42 He thus contemplated a society-wide process of
speech from one precinct galvanizing thought and speech in other precincts. In dis-
cussing the clerics, Brennan made a second point: that a different sort of process can
take place on the individual level. Skirting the clerics' claim that they did not au-
thorize the disputed advertisement, Brennan in effect imagined that they did authorize
it, although without actual malice. 143 According the same strong privilege to these
non-media critics of government, Brennan intimated that strong speech (other than
calculated lies) protesting official conduct merited protection as a way for profoundly
alienated individuals or groups to reclaim their citizenship - or at least to take
worthwhile first steps of reconnection with society.
But these are only intimations of a process account, glimpses between the lines
of celebrated decisions. We need to turn to other disciplines for a firmer understand-
ing of how the experience of public speech can inform the self-governance value.
H. A PRIMARY PROCESS APPROACH: SPEECH AND MORAL AGENCY IN SOCIETY
A process account of the self-governance value would not displace the sub-
stantive account but would fill a considerable gap by addressing the dynamic of
citizenship. To fill the gap convincingly, the process account must uncover a link
between citizenship and the chief components of the First Amendment relevant here:
liberty and language.
138 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
139 Id. at 375-77.
'40 Id. at 375.
'41 Id. at 377.
142 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
143 Id. at 286.
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In a recent article, Maria Dimova-Cookson engagingly probes an old dichotomy.'
Her starting point is Isaiah Berlin's 1958 lecture, in which he famously contrasted
negative and positive liberties, identifying the former as freedom from interference
by others, and the latter as freedom to be one's own master.'45 Berlin's point was
that arguments for positive liberty can mask an illiberal agenda: tampering with
human beings by trying to control individual behavior, all in the name of their true
selves. 146 Exploring the thought of philosopher T.H. Green (1836-1882), Dimova-
Cookson aims to make the dichotomy irrelevant,'47 showing a relation between the
two kinds of freedom and, therefore, the proper function and value of each. She
artfully explains the roots of negative liberty and offers a far less menacing view of
positive liberty. But her real contribution is to posit a dialectic between these two
forms of freedom.
In Dimova-Cookson's account, the nature of freedom "'differs according to the
nature of the object which the man makes his own, or with which he identifies
himself."". 48 As the individual grows or changes in his "notion of the good," his
concept of freedom changes. "' In the personal realm, "juristic" freedom is the
power to do what one desires, whereas "true" freedom derives from the "pursuit of
self-perfection" or growth beyond desire.5 0 Dimova-Cookson identifies true freedom
with moral action, defined as action that is good for oneself as well as for others.' 5'
Juristic freedom, on the other hand, pertains to ordinary action - conduct per-
formed for one's own good, "not necessarily to the exclusion of the good of others
but not necessarily to its inclusion."'' 5 2 The person "experience[s] juristic freedom
in the pursuit of ordinary good," and she experiences "'true' freedom in the pursuit
of moral good."'15 3 As Dimova-Cookson explains, "moral action entails the cost of
sacrificing one's ordinary good '' "M and "cultivating the will to do the 'right things." 55
This cultivation involves "giv[ing] up doing what [one] likes in the name of achiev-
ing something of higher value."' 56 But ordinary action is not to be denigrated; indeed,
in Dimova-Cookson's thought, departing from Green, the freedoms associated with
ordinary and moral actions are engaged in a dialectic, such that each is a worthy end
See generally Dimova-Cookson, supra note 21.
BERLIN, Two Concepts, supra note 20, at 118, 123, 132.
'46 Id. at 132-33.
14 Dimova-Cookson writes that it is her purpose to "redefine" the "duality in the usage
of freedom" in a "non-contradictory way." Dimova-Cookson, supra note 21, at 510.
141 Id. at 512 (quoting T.H. Green, On the Different Senses of Freedom).
149 Id. at 517.
'10 Id. at 513.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 514.
"A Id. at 515.
"I5 Id. at 516.
156 Id. at 515.
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in itself. Thus, "[a] moral action always has an agent and a recipient," and when an
agent engages in moral action and produces a moral good, the recipient receives an
ordinary good and can do with it what she wants. 57 The actor's moral good is an end
in itself, but so is the ordinary good that he provides the recipient, because it amounts
to an expansion of the recipient's own freedom. 58
Negative and positive freedoms are a subset of this other pair of freedoms.'59
Whereas juristic and true freedoms pertain to life's personal sphere, negative and
positive freedoms pertain to the political sphere," 6 the locus of the self-governance
value. Positive freedom is the power to take moral action in the public realm; "it is
concerned specifically with contributions to the common good.... .""' As another
scholar puts it, without "active participation and ability to in some degree subor-
dinate private to public perspective, one [isn't] really free. Rather, one [is] in the
bondage of self-love, narrow-mindedness, and social indifference."'62 Positive freedom,
then, is a "capacity to in some measure look at public problems and opportunities from
an enlarged point of view attentive to the good of the country as a whole."'63 Dimova-
Cookson' s contribution is to place this unsurprising definition of positive liberty in
a surprising process with negative liberty, which corresponds to juristic liberty in the
personal realm and is defined as a qualified freedom of rights-bearing citizens "to
do as [they] like" in the political realm, including the freedom "to pursue private
ends" and to decide against "'mak[ing] the common good [their] own."" 64 She
depicts a "process of interaction"'65 between these two forms of liberty. An actor's
exercise of positive liberty is a moral action - in the sense of a contribution to social
welfare' 66 - and produces a moral good for the actor himself, a sense of "achieve-
ment and personal liberation."'167 Equally important, it can produce an ordinary good
for its recipient, an increase in opportunities to "develop[]... capacities ' '161 for choice-
making within the rules of the society. The process perspective suggests that
beneficiaries of moral action "could become contributors to the common good.., in
due course."' 69
117 Id. at 516.
158 Id.
151 Id. at 518.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 521.
162 KETCHAM, supra note 34, at 40.
163 Id. at 43.
164 Dimova-Cookson, supra note 21, at 524-25.
165 Id. at 518.
"6 Dimova-Cookson writes that "[p]ositive freedom means fulfilling your social duties;
it means acting with concern for the welfare of your society." Id. at 520. In the same vein,
she adds, "[Plositive freedom (like 'true' freedom) is based on a voluntary sacrifice of juristic
freedom. .. ." Id. at 521.
167 Id. at 522.
168 Id. at 517.
169 Id. at 520.
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Dimova-Cookson, therefore, posits a relation in which an increase in a person's
negative liberty provides a groundwork for the possible exercise of moral agency
(positive freedom), with the effect of contributing to an increase in negative liberty
among recipients of the moral action, who may develop increased capacity for their
own moral action, and so on. In this sense, citizenship is a function of liberties-in-
process. Dimova-Cookson sees that citizenship means the development and exercise
of moral agency, the exercise of positive liberty in service of the public good, 70 and
that moral service enlarges the scope of freedom of others to live as they will within
the legal constraints of organized society.
This framework can help us understand more deeply the value of freedom of
speech in Sullivan. In tracing the First Amendment's history to its origins, quoting
James Madison on the sovereignty of the people, and locating a "central meaning"
in the historical defeat of the Sedition Act, Justice Brennan saw the constitutional
protection of speech and press as an exercise of positive liberty by "the people"
through their first representatives. Arising from a commitment to an Enlightenment
ideal of independence, which advanced an ethos of individuality, this prescription
for liberty was essentially negative in statement and meaning ("Congress shall make
no law .... ."). In creating the actual malice standard and reducing the common law's
regulatory scope, Sullivan enforced the prescription by widening the negative liberty
of those it termed citizen-critics of official conduct. By limiting impediments to the
flow of social information on "major public issues of our time," the Court imagined
a communicative relation between citizen-critics and members of the public, where
one kind of freedom creates conditions for another. The implication was that greater
liberty of dissemination would contribute to the moral agency of speech-recipients
generally. With increased information and commentary, many recipients would
have additional reason to reflect on public matters, alone or dialogically, and to make
moral choices accordingly, casting votes or taking other measures aimed at realizing
a common good. These choices would be exercises of positive liberty, set in motion
by the law's recognition of greater negative liberty for speech on public matters.
On this reading, Sullivan contemplates a dynamic that centers on the flow of infor-
mation and a process of interactive freedoms. We can call this the "language/liberty
dynamic," or the "social process" account of the self-governance value of speech.
It arises from a conviction that the First Amendment, as it dissolves constraints on
public discourse, lays a foundation for exchange about public matters as well as for
other moral action by recipient-members of the public. Responses by recipients can
amount to exercises of positive liberty, in some cases aimed at removing legal and
societal constraints on those held back by unjust rules or prejudice, thus expanding
the negative liberty of the latter.
What does a schema of liberties-in-process capture about freedoms of speech
and press and their connection to self-governance? First, the schema strives for a
70 As Dimova-Cookson explains, "To be positively free means to act as a conscientious
citizen for the welfare of your society." Id. at 528.
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more accurate description of modem democracy by de-emphasizing the citizen's
isolation as seeker or molder of political truth, and by recognizing the person as
actually situated - whether with fellow living citizens, historical predecessors,
future generations, citizens of other countries, or simply other minds whom the
citizen must encounter to make sense of public questions. The model reinforces that
democracy concerns not only political consciousness but civic being - which is
being-with - although surely being-with can involve conflict and its often imperfect
resolution. Second, the schema helps us (a) to see that more than one form of liberty
is often in play in speech controversies, (b) to define those forms carefully, and (c)
to grasp that each form, negative as well as positive, has value. Third, the schema
adds to our understanding of citizenship. It conceptualizes citizenship as the exercise
of an opportunity to work for the public good, however difficult the latter is to
define. And the schema lends itself to this Article's argument that speech and press
freedoms, as elaborated by American courts, exist to facilitate (even if not to coerce)
the citizen's arrival at that moment of opportunity. Finally, the schema helps us
discern the logic behind the creation of legal rules concerning speech and press.
However the schema does not explain everything. Although it can help us see
how a legal rule based on negative liberty might be justified by hopes of its
generative effect on positive liberty, the schema does not help us see how legal lines
should be drawn. How much negative liberty will aid the desired dynamic? Can too
much of it inhibit a recipient's moral agency? These questions suggest that the legal
rulemaking project limits the schema with a causative principle, a factor related to
motivating the speech process. For that we turn again to Sullivan. Recall that Justice
Brennan was unwilling to go as far as Justices Black, Douglas, and Goldberg, who
insisted that the First Amendment accorded citizen-critics absolute immunity from
libel suits brought by public figures. Why did Brennan and five others resist? Why
did they not expand the negative liberty of the Times and of the black clerics as far
as the three concurring Justices thought it should go? Although he may not have put
it in these terms, Brennan clearly saw that the dialectic of positive and negative
liberty could only "work" if trust were built into the process. In this context, trust
refers to good-faith understanding and acceptance, on the part of citizen critics and
the public at large, of each player's social role in the speech dynamic. A rule of
absolute immunity for citizen-critics, freeing them to inject intentionally or reck-
lessly false, defamatory statements into political debate without accountability, would
seriously undermine the functioning of the dynamic. Expanding the citizen-critic's
negative liberty to that degree would, in all likelihood, drastically reduce the exercise
of positive liberty expected of the public at large. The risk would be too great that
a system warranting no practical reliance on the accuracy of public speech and provi-
ding no penalty for willful misrepresentation would work against moral agency, that
is, sustained public participation. The desired interaction of liberties, then, seems
to require an underlying force of trust, a human element providing motivation for
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the moral agency at the heart of the process account. The same element can be found
in the Court's speech jurisprudence in privacy and access settings, 71
These cases exhibit a consistent sense of what political trust entails in the context
of speech by citizen-critics of government, most often in the form of the institutional
press. In each, the Court acted in a rulemaking role, creating analytic frameworks that
extend the negative liberty of the institutional press and project benefits of that
extended negative liberty for the citizen. Each implies not only that the chosen legal
framework will encourage increased dissemination of information on public matters
but also that the citizen's opportunities to exercise the moral responsibility of civic
participation - in one form or another - will increase. The Dimova-Cookson-
based process model suggests a dynamic of liberty, as explained above, which in the
case law amounts to a dynamic of opportunity for civic engagement. The model
could also be described as a model encouraging arrival - the arrival of citizens at
a place of active involvement in civic life, in whatever form or forms they choose.
But what of cases that do not primarily involve the institutional press, cases that
implicate citizens facing a political, social, and media-saturated culture quite dif-
ferent from the one that gave rise to Sullivan and its progeny? The latter cases and
the process model they imply remain vital, to be sure, but new problems afflict the
political environment, and First Amendment litigation increasingly focuses on
situations not directly related to the institutional press. A case from the late 1990s
examined the meaning for citizens of a state law ostensibly designed to protect them
from baser features - mud-slinging and mendacity - of contemporary politics.
The case is Washington ex rel. Public Disclosure Commission v. 119 Vote No!
Committee,172 decided en banc by the Washington Supreme Court. Dedicated to
truth-in-politics, the statute imposed penalties on persons who, acting with actual
171 In Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979), the Court considered the
constitutionality of a criminal statute requiring a newspaper to obtain a court's permission
before publishing the name of a juvenile involved in juvenile proceedings. Id. Although the
institutional press sought full immunity from state regulation for truthful publication, the
Court discerned a narrower rule in the Court's precedents: "[If a newspaper lawfully obtains
truthful information about a matter of public significance then state officials may not consti-
tutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need to further a state interest of
the highest order." Id. at 103. The Court's curious inclusion of an element related to the
press's method of gathering news (that it be "lawfully obtained") makes sense from the
perspective of maintaining public confidence in the press and thus safeguarding the potential
for sparking civic participation by readers. Much the same could be said of the Court's access
jurisprudence. The first prong of the Court's framework for determining the existence of a
qualified right of access to a particular proceeding is whether the proceeding historically has
been open to the public. See, e.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (II), 478 U.S. 1, 8
(1986). This prong is a useful limiting principle but also serves as a surrogate for consider-
ations of public trust. Publication based on newsgathering in historically open venues is more
likely to engender public confidence and thus spark public participation than publication based
on questionable intrusions into places or proceedings that are historically closed.
172 957 P.2d 691 (Wash. 1998) (en banc).
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malice, sponsored false political advertising.'73 If the concurring justices in Sullivan
sought to protect more political speech than the libel tort had protected previously,
the Washington statute in Vote No took the opposite approach: it criminalized more
speech than libel law had ever subjected to sanctions. But the drafters claimed good
intentions. As Justice Talmadge (who voted to uphold the law) pointed out, the
statute merely sought to rid state elections of calculated lies. 174 Justice Talmadge
noted the law's context: "the increasing nastiness of modem American political
campaigns," the "'win at any cost' attitude involving vilification of opponents and
their ideas," in short, the advent of a "new type of campaign" that "has caused too
many of our fellow citizens to turn away from participation in the political process." 75
Talmadge could find no protection in the First Amendment for intentional falsity in
political campaigns and found the statute a narrowly tailored vehicle to serve a com-
pelling state interest.
76
His analysis did not prevail. The majority noted that "the First Amendment
operates to insure the public decides what is true and false with respect to gover-
nance,"'177 and that "'[tihe very purpose of the First Amendment is to foreclose public
authority from assuming a guardianship of the public mind .... , More speech,
rather than less, was the proper remedy in poisonous campaigns. 179 The majority
concluded that the statute would chill the speech of "the faint of heart" and lacked
a crucial limiting feature of the libel tort, the requirement that the statement be
defamatory.180 But more than these objections, the majority worried that the statute
(a) could embroil courts in political conflicts disguised as legal contests over the truth
of campaign statements, and (b) could be subject to manipulation by its implement-
ing agency or by candidates seeking "to impugn the electoral process rather than
promote truthfulness."' 8' l In effect, manipulative use of a truth-in-politics statute
was more likely to poison public discourse than risks posed by non-defamatory false-
hoods, even if intentional. Moreover, by keeping prosecutors out of the business of
examining election statements for criminal behavior, and by not sparing voters the
task of trying to distinguish true from false non-defamatory statements in a campaign,
the Vote No majority relied, if less than persuasively, on citizens' commitment and
capacity to monitor campaigns attentively.
The Dimova-Cookson "social process" model does not capture a case like Vote
No. The dynamic of liberty-opportunity-arrival that describes the majority's "social
173 Id. at 694.
'7' Id. at 701 (Talmadge, J., concurring).
175 Id.
176 Id. at 708.
177 Id. at 695 (majority opinion).
178 Id. (omission in original) (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516,545 (1945) (Jackson,
J., concurring)).
179 Id. at 696.
180 Id. at 696-97.
sI Id. at 696, 698.
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process" thinking in Sullivan cannot account for the concern that was common to
justices on both sides in Vote No: the problem of the citizen who views the political
system as closed, mendacious, or otherwise in violation of an original promise. The
justices agonized over two sobering responses: the majority's - that over-crimi-
nalizing political speech distorts public debate, forcing the public into an arm's-
length, skeptical, even cynical connection to politics; or the concurrence's - that
citizens already share that grim perspective and that the statute simply responds in
tailored fashion to a politics that has turned thinking citizens away.
I. A SECONDARY PROCESS ACCOUNT: SPEECH AND MORAL
AGENCY IN THE PERSON
Vote No intimates that a second "speech process" can underlie legal thought in
contemporary speech cases. The primary account considered above - the "social
process" account - envisions a dynamic of liberty in society at large and generates
legal protections that, informed by considerations of trust, are designed to promote
opportunities for moral agency. A secondary account looks at liberty on a smaller
canvas - not society at large, but the individual interacting with and within society.
Its focus is on individual, not social, process. Its fear is that the social process's con-
siderations of trust have been insufficient to maintain the citizen's interest or loyalty.
It concentrates less on creating opportunities for moral agency and more on promot-
ing its actual exercise. If the social process account concerns facilitating the arrival
of the citizen at a moment of moral opportunity, the individual process account
looks toward a "later" stage in civic consciousness: the return of the citizen - from
a kind of self-imposed exile from political participation due to a sense of futility or
perceptions of injustice - to a moment of moral re-engagement.
The "individual process" model is secondary in the sense that it is a subset of the
broader "social process" model. The latter model contemplates that persons who pos-
sess a range of negative liberty may undertake the moral agency of speech on public
issues. The secondary process asks: How might this happen, if a first supply of social
trust runs out? In these circumstances, what sort of journey is left for the citizen
whose negative liberty is ensured by law but whose exercise of positive liberty is a
matter of choice? We need to go beyond the broad strokes of the social process model
and probe the speech process at the level of the individual and those immediately
around her, the citizen not receptive to the moral agency of citizenship. How does
she move toward moral agency, and what sort of transformative process, if any, awaits
her in the speech process?
Rooted in political theory, Dimova-Cookson's model understandably lacks
specificity about a psychological process of moving from alienation to involved citizen-
ship through speech. A more likely source of insight would be works of the imagi-
nation - portraits by novelists or poets of alienation, who probe the promise and
dangers of speech in an individual's stasis between alienation and citizenship. An
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ancient story that grappled with this problem is Sophocles's play, Philoctetes.Is2
The fact that it is told and retold today suggests a timeless relevance of its theme:
the dilemma of the individual who has been abandoned by society's majorities, and
whose bitterness completes his virtually absolute isolation." 3 It has been suggested
that an attribute of modern political consciousness in American society is identi-
fication with outsider status - a sense of homelessness, isolation, and futility about
participation in politics. I 4 If alienation is pervasive, extending beyond minority
groups to those who have majority status yet lack a strong sense of belonging in
modem culture, then the tale of Philoctetes holds special interest. It may expand our
understanding of the role of speech in becoming a participating citizen.
A. Sophocles: Speech in Equilibrium With Other Goods
Before the play begins, Philoctetes, high-born archer and part of the Greek
forces bound for the war against Troy, suffers an unexpected injury: a serpent bites
his foot as he enters a temple.8 5 The wound, intensely painful, has an unbearable
stench. The Greeks cannot tolerate the odor or the man's cries; he has become a
182 In an essay published in 1983, a noted classicist wrote, "Philoctetes has attracted more
critical attention in the last fifteen years than any other play of Sophocles, more perhaps than
any other Greek tragedy. This may be partly because its themes - alienation and communi-
cation, ends and means - are familiar and important to modem readers .... "P.E. Easterling,
Philoctetes and Modern Criticism, in OXFORD READINGS IN GREEK TRAGEDY 217, 217 (Erich
Segal ed., 1983).
183 In thinking about the meaning of citizenship from the perspective of the humanities,
Julia R. Lupton identifies a "literature of citizenship," writings that "[in] their incisive, iconic,
inaugural, or interventionist forms dramatize and reconstitute key myths and rhythms for liter-
ature and politics in the West." Julia Reinhard Lupton, Rights, Commandments, and the Litera-
ture of Citizenship, 66 MOD. LANG. Q. 21, 25 & n.3 (March 2005). She argues that "in the
Western tradition, we would do better marking the origins of the literature of citizenship in
tragedy than in epic, in Sophocles rather than in Homer." JULIA REINHARD LUPTON, CmIzEN-
SAINTS: SHAKESPEARE AND POLMCAL THEOLOGY 207-08 (2005).
"4 BURT, supra note 55, at 68 (arguing that "the contemporary social experience of all
Americans" has been a deep sense of "tenuous social bonding"). See also id. at 77 (main-
taining that "American society today is characterized by a pervasive sense of homelessness");
cf. Morton J. Horwitz, Lecture, The Warren Court and the Pursuit of Justice, 50 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 5, 10 (1993) (arguing that the justices forming the majority in Brown v. Board
of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), "were, in different and complicated ways, themselves
outsiders").
1"5 For the sources of the Philoctetes story, see Meredith Clarke Hoppin, What Happens
in Philoctetes?, in SOPHOCLES: MODERN CRITICALVIEWS 137 (Harold Bloomed., 1990). For
a classic study of the Philoctetes story as used by Sophocles, other ancient Greek dramatists,
and writers over the centuries, see EDMUND WILSON, Philoctetes: The Wound and the Bow,
in THEWOUND AND THE Bow: SEVEN STUDIES IN LITERATURE 272 (1941) [hereinafter WILSON,
The Wound].
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monster. 86 Under the leadership of the supremely practical Odysseus, they make
a fateful decision - to abandon their fellow warrior on Lemnos, a deserted island.
Their one act of pity is to leave him a tool of survival: his bow, a mystical weapon
given to him by Hercules in thanks for lighting Hercules's funeral pyre and releasing
him from suffering of his own. As the play starts, ten years have passed since the
Greeks abandoned Philoctetes. The war against Troy has raged on, and the Greeks
have learned from a soothsayer that they cannot win the war without the participa-
tion of Philoctetes and Neoptolemus, the son of the now-dead champion, Achilles.
The Greeks dispatch Odysseus and Neoptolemus to the island; their mission is
to bring Philoctetes back to the Greek forces and to sail for Troy and ultimate victory.
The Greeks know that Philoctetes resents them for his miserable existence and will
deny them any request. Odysseus devises a plan: Neoptolemus will present himself
to Philoctetes and truthfully identify himself as Achilles's son, but he will contrive
a story of his own supposed anger and resentment toward the Greeks. By this de-
ception, he will gain the outcast's sympathy. With luck, Neoptolemus will find an
opportunity to seize the bow; unarmed, Philoctetes will be powerless to resist rejoin-
ing the Greeks.
As the plan is set in motion, the play unfolds a compelling theme - the stark
limitations of language as a means of restoring an alienated citizen's faith in the
political order. The three principal characters constantly refer to "words" - true
words, false words, promises of men, messages of gods - and each man has a
highly problematic relation to language. Odysseus, invoking "Hermes, the lord of
stratagem, ' scripts the deception of Philoctetes, justifying the plan by the sheer
necessity of securing the warrior's aid in taking Troy after years of frustrated battle.
For Odysseus, speech is first and last an instrument; it can and should be used, in his
view, to achieve whatever the greater good commands. The object of speech is
neither discernment nor revelation, but implementation: as long as leadership cites
a plausible public objective, a calculated lie has legitimacy. In portraying Odysseus,
Sophocles makes clear that the instrumentalist perspective is impoverished, but the
play does not offer a clear alternative.18 8 As an audience, we want Philoctetes to be
healed and to return to society, and we soon enough see that traditional methods of
persuasion will not come close to achieving those ends.
For Neoptolemus, in contrast, words control, and man is the instrument. The
idealistic youth is mesmerized by words, mastered by their sound and fury, unable
to turn speech to advantage in the creation of identity. At the outset, he balks at
joining Odysseus's deception, but the leader's rhetoric gathers him in. Later, the
186 WILSON, The Wound, supra note 185, at 275.
187 SOPHOCLES, PHILOCTETES, supra note 22, at 156.
188 "For all of his ends-and-means morality, Odysseus is no mere caricature; his wisdom
is worldly and unscrupulous, no doubt, but it represents a broader kind of second-rate wisdom
than is to be summed in the mere politician." CEDRIC H. WHrrMAN, SOPHOCLES: A STUDY OF
HEROIc HUMANISM 180 (3d prtg. 1971).
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Chorus's wrenching account of Philoctetes's history so affects the young man that
he profoundly identifies with Philoctetes before they ever meet. At the same time,
when Neoptolemus acts out the deception, his false words take charge, and he be-
comes the figure he represents. Language for him is a web of image and emotion,
confounding judgment and splitting the self. It is not a vehicle for discovering truth
about the world or one's capacity for independent mind.
For Philoctetes, speech has a third effect: it does not disperse him into many selves
but locks him in a single, stubborn mindset. When he first appears in the play, he
longs for communication, crying to his visitors:
0 strangers!
Who may you be and from what country have you put into this
land that is harborless and desolate?...
I would like to hear your speech. Do not shrink from me...
nay, in pity for one so wretched and so lonely, for a sufferer so
desolate and so friendless, speak to me... Oh, answer!' 89
However, his "frantic words"'" limit any real ability to communicate. He can do
little more than moan, thunder, build up extravagant hopes, lash out when they dis-
integrate, condemn, or forgive - all in a rush of bombast and self-pity.
These differences mean that the three main characters spend most of the play
unable to meet through words. But the language problem that Sophocles creates is
considerably more complex than a case of missed dialogue. When Neoptolemus
carries out the ruse, telling the story of ill treatment by the Greeks, everything that
he says is ostensibly false - yet because he has already clashed with Odysseus on
whether such lies are necessary, many of Neoptolemus's false statements about
estrangement from community ironically are true. Almost in a mirror image, when
Philoctetes launches into his tale of victimhood, everything that he says of his
experience at the hands of the Greeks is ostensibly true - yet because his bitterness
has brought much of the misery on himself, many of his "true" statements attributing
blame to others ironically are false. Thus, not only do the two men talk past each
other, but each talks past himself. Language only seems to take each man more
deeply into a hole of ignorance. These confusions signal that conditions among the
Greeks have broken down on a fundamental level. 191
189 SOPHOCLES, PHILOCTETES, supra note 22, at 158.
'90 Id. at 180.
1' On Neoptolemus's intricate brew of truth and lies to deceive Philoctetes, see MARK
RINGER, ELECTRA AND THE EMPTY URN: METATHEATER AND RoLE PLAYING IN SOPHOCLES
107-11 (1998). Sophocles's odd use of the Chorus reinforces the theme of social breakdown.
In Greek tragic form, prolonged misrepresentation is not the Chorus's usual role. Id. at 111.
In contrast, this play features a "complicit chorus," Diskin Clay, Introduction to SOPHOCLES,
PHILOCTETES 3, 18 (Carl Phillips trans., 2003), readily joining in lies to entrap Philoctetes.
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Language proves particularly futile in the plan to secure Philoctetes's return to
the Greeks. These efforts are centered in Neoptolemus, who has two seemingly ir-
reconcilable objectives: wise marshaling of forces to defeat the Trojans, and justice
for his new friend. Throughout the play, he asks how wisdom of this kind and
justice can be attained. 9 2 Seeking the first, he agrees to lie to Philoctetes; serving
the second, he eventually tells Philoctetes the truth, still trying to win him back to
the Greeks. Ultimately, although the young man grows in sympathy and judgment,
he cannot synthesize his goals. All that he accomplishes through his verbal contacts,
sensitive and winning though they are, is a decision to defy the Greeks - and his
own destiny - by taking Philoctetes, unhealed and unlikely to be healed, back to
his homeland.
However, Sophocles has a different ending in mind. As the two friends prepare
to flee together, Sophocles supplies a stunning coup de theatre: the divinized Hercules,
as deus ex machina, appears, reverses their decision, and sends them off to Troy.
Standing on a high ledge, where the angle of vision is appropriately wide, Hercules
commands them to "hearken[] to [his] words,"'93 surely an ironic order in a situation
already snarled by speech and by speech-about-speech. But the god's words point
the men beyond themselves to other goods, particularly the overarching purposes
of the world they know, and he places the agonies of Philoctetes in a broader context
of suffering and transcendence.'94 He assures fame and glory to both men and heal-
ing for Philoctetes, but he cautions them about the constant necessity of humility
before existence. 95 He thus identifies moral agency not exclusively with the freedoms
they have been exercising - the liberty of complaint, defamation, and self-scrutiny
through speech - but with a mosaic of goods, including a recommitment to com-
munity ends, the act of returning to and undertaking repair of "a world of imperfect
justice."' 96 Given the sorry conditions of Greek life - where men discard other
men as monsters, language leads not to clarity but darkness, and wisdom confounds
justice - attending to fundamental social needs takes priority over settling scores,
and priority even over the speech of dire protest. The god's commission to follow
communal over individual need releases Philoctetes from physical and verbal cap-
tivity, perhaps enabling him to become what Benjamin Barber calls "that odd creature
Homo politicus who inhabits both the ancient and modern worlds of democracy:
192 SOPHOCLES, PHILOCTETES, supra note 22, at 181-82 (exchange between Neoptolemus
and Odysseus on wisdom versus justice).
'9' Id. at 186.
" Robert J. Rabel perceptively suggests that the god's success in persuading Philoctetes
stems from the god's use of mythos in his argument. Robert J. Rabel, Sophocles' Philoctetes
and the Interpretation of Iliad 9, 30 ARETHuSA 297, 302 (1997). "Mythos" is self-referential
speech and "seems to be especially effective when the speaker is able to support a directive
or request through an act of recollection, challenging his audience to the imitation and emu-
lation of his own heroic achievements." Id.
'9' SOPHOCLES, PHILOCTETES, supra note 22, at 187.
196 CHARLES SEGAL, SOPHOCLES' TRAGIC WORLD: DIVINITY, NATuRE, SOCIETY 118 (1995).
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dependent, yet under democracy self-determining; insufficient and ignorant, yet under
democracy teachable; selfish, yet under democracy cooperative; stubborn and solip-
sistic, yet under democracy creative and capable of genuine self-transformation."197
Philoctetes is about alienation's failure to achieve reconciliation through language
alone, and the role of other goods, when speech reaches a dead end, to secure that rec-
onciliation. Other goods include repair of basic conditions upon which the flourish-
ing of freedom depends. The challenging idea of Philoctetes is that speech exists
in equilibrium with such other goods and that the alienated citizen's return can stem
from identification with a project of fundamental repair.
B. Heaney: Speech as Liberating the Listener
For Sophocles, impasse gives way to the god's example of readjusting one's
vision to the obligations of the social compact. In Irish poet Seamus Heaney's 1990
version of the same play,' the focus shifts from god to friend, from Hercules to
Neoptolemus. In fact, Hercules drops out of the play altogether; the Chorus speaks
his lines,1 99 confirming Heaney's interest not so much in the priority of fundamental
social needs over the uses of language, as in the priority of speech to determine those
needs in the first place.
What attracted this lyric poet to Philoctetes? In an address accepting the Nobel
Prize for Literature in 1995, Heaney invoked his coming of age in "a situation of
ongoing political violence" in Northern Ireland.2" Musing that perhaps "Tacitus
was right.. . that peace is merely the desolation left behind after the decisive oper-
ations of merciless power,"20' he recalled a world encompassing both "the atrocious
nature of the IRA's campaign of bombings and killings" and the "ruthlessness of the
British Army on occasions like Bloody Sunday in Derry in 1972. "202 As a youth in
the mold of Neoptolemus, he possessed a "consciousness quickly realiz[ing] that it
[was] the site of variously contending discourses," and he could anticipate the "adult
predicament" of "adjudicat[ing] among promptings variously ethical, aesthetical,
moral, political, metrical, sceptical [sic], cultural, topical, typical, post-colonial and,
taken all together, simply impossible. 2 3
197 BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITCS FOR A NEW AGE
119 (1984).
198 HEANEY, supra note 23.
' Id. at 1 ("By the end of the prologue, CHORUS LEADER has positioned herself where she
will speak as HERCULES at the end of the play.").
" Seamus Heaney, Crediting Poetry, Nobel Prize Acceptance Speech at the Swedish
Academy Nobel (Dec. 7, 1995), http://nobelprize.org/literature/laureates/1995/heaney-lecture.
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Heaney's address spoke of Northern Ireland in a way that showed what he must
have seen in, and brought to, the story of Philoctetes. Of the two blood-soaked decades
leading to cease-fires in the mid-1990s, he said:
The violence from below was then productive of nothing but a
retaliatory violence from above, the dream ofjustice became sub-
sumed into the callousness of reality, and people settled into a
quarter century of life-waste and spirit-waste, of hardening atti-
tudes and narrowing possibilities that were the natural result of
political solidarity, traumatic suffering and sheer emotional self-
204protectiveness.
Here we recognize both Ireland and Lemnos; as one scholar notes, The Cure of Troy
uses the Sophoclean framework to ruminate on "Ireland and the Irish who have suf-
fered.' '205 In both the play and the Nobel speech, however, Heaney "[made] space...
for the marvellous as well as for the murderous, '20 expressing belief in the resilience
of moral agency in the face of horrors within and without. And he related all of this
to poetry's own contribution to humane values, even to the "creation and mainte-
nance of a salubrious political space.,
207
It is unsurprising, then, that the central moment in The Cure at Troy comes not
at the end, as in Sophocles, but in the center of the play, where Neoptolemus begins
to abandon "the Odyssean narrative"2 8 by unlocking the hidden truth. Entangled
in the scheme by Odysseus, Neoptolemus at first proves exceptionally adept at
trickery; Philoctetes believes everything he says. But then something odd happens.
Odysseus sends a crew member to interrupt the conversation between Neoptolemus
and Philoctetes; disguised as a merchant with supposed news of the Greek plans, the
crew member is there to cement the men's false bond.209 Neoptolemus plays along
by forcing information out of the "merchant." But as he plays the frustrated infor-
mation gatherer, Neoptolemus seems to experience real frustration at being kept in
the dark; Odysseus has not told him in advance what the crew member will say, and
thus Neoptolemus's irritation is not entirely a charade.210 Once the merchant leaves,
204 Id.
2105 Marianne McDonald, Seamus Heaney's Cure at Troy: Politics and Poetry, 3 CLASSICS
IRELAND 129 (1996).
206 Heaney, Nobel Speech, supra note 200.
207 Id.
208 Hugh Denard, Seamus Heaney, Colonialism, and The Cure: Sophoclean Re-visions,
22 PA: J. PERFORMANCE & ART 1, 12 (2000).
209 HEANEY, supra note 23, at 29-34 (scene in which MERCHANT discusses pending arrival
of the Greeks to seize Philoctetes).
210 Odysseus has simply said that he will send a disguised crew member "full of sailor-talk"
to the scene of conversation between Neoptolemus and Philoctetes, and that Neoptolemus will
be "fit to read between the lines/ For the message, whatever the message is." Id. at 11.
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Neoptolemus appears exhausted, far less committed than before to the entire enter-
prise; he has had his own taste of thwarted communication and perhaps senses the
blow to human connection when speech is manipulated.
Immediately after this, he has the chance to hold the sacred bow, which the archer
had received from Hercules as a reward for "generosity. '21' As the bow is "proffered,
elevated and held significantly" between the two men, it becomes a sign of human
warmth, even an emblem of speech itself. After this ritual and after witnessing the
archer's attack of physical pain, Neoptolemus's sympathy increases, and self-disgust
affects his demeanor. Soon Philoctetes is forcing him to speak, and Neoptolemus
can no longer hold back. He tells everything. Then he interprets and even advises.
In fact, some scholars identify the heart of the play as the young man's growth
through speech - as he abandons one narrative and takes on his own - and the
curative impact of his speech on Philoctetes. It appears that receipt of the young
man's words, honestly formed and generously shared, humanizes Philoctetes and
restores him to society. On this view, the god's speech at the end is superfluous; the
alienated man's heart has already changed.
Heaney thus focuses on the act and effects of untrammeled communication -
or what the Chorus introducing his version of the play calls "poetry. '21 3 In his
Nobel speech and elsewhere, Heaney described poetry in ways that resonate with the
play's account of self-generated speech. Heaney discussed poetry's energy, buoy-
ancy, "fission and fusion, 214 its capacity "to touch the base of our sympathetic nature
while taking in at the same time the unsympathetic nature of the world to which that
nature is constantly exposed," 215 its power to "re-tun[e] the world itself... like the
impatient thump which unexpectedly restores the picture to the television set, '216 and
its occasional feat of "open[ing] unexpected and unedited communications between
our nature and the nature of the reality we inhabit,, 21 7 "intimating a possible order
beyond itself."218 In the latter sense, unfettered speech enables the civic imagination
not simply to remember tradition and established values but to envision new pos-
sibilities, the landscape of change.
Heaney, then, is less concerned with resurrecting the complex balance of fun-
damental values stressed by Sophocles in giving Hercules the last word, and more
interested in capturing the sometimes unexpected benefits and energies of unimpeded
communicative exchange. An essay by Edmund Wilson emphasized the paradoxical
211 Id. at 37 (Philoctetes explaining that his "generous behavior" prompted the god to give
him the bow and implying that Neoptolemus's own behavior has been similar).
212 Id. (stage directions).
213 Id. at 2.
214 Heaney, Nobel Speech, supra note 200.
215 id.
216 Id.
217 SEAMUSHEANEY, The Government of the Tongue, in THEGOVERNMENTOFTHETONGUE:
SELECTED PROSE 1978-1987, at 91, 93 (The Noonday Press 1990) (1988).
218 Id. at 94.
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fruits of Neoptolemus's particular odyssey in the play: "[I]n taking the risk to his
cause which is involved in the recognition of his common humanity with the sick
man, in refusing to break his word, [Neoptolemus] dissolves Philoctetes' stubborn-
ness, and thus cures him and sets him free, and saves the campaign as well."
21 9
C. Scott: Speech as Instrument of Discovery
A third telling of the Philoctetes story occurs in a four-novel sequence known
as The Raj Quartet by British author Paul Scott." These novels, set in India during
World War II and dealing with the Nationalist movement for independence and its
effects on an array of British residents and Indians caught up in momentous polit-
ical change, have been called "among the greatest prose fictions of this and of the
nineteenth century. '22' At the narrative's center is an Indian, raised as "Harry Coomer"
in England and transplanted by events in the late 1930s to India, where he has no
choice but to try to survive as "Hari Kumar," amidst a world that sees him as stranger
and outcast. Late in the fourth novel of the sequence, after encountering the racist op-
erations of the British Raj, including false arrests and imprisonments, Kumar begins
to sign his writings for an Indian newspaper as "Philoctetes. 222 Scott thereby blends
elements of Sophoclean tragedy with a vivid portrait of contemporary conflict, en-
duing his complex work with both specific historical insight and transcendent themes
of human aspiration and the search for identity. If Sophocles emphasized the voice
of the god, and Heaney stressed the voice of the friend, Scott's focus is the voice of
the Philoctetes-figure himself, the rootless citizen who suffers profound disaffection
but nonetheless seeks a way back to civic participation through speech - his own.
In Sophocles's and Heaney's versions, we see Philoctetes in the bitter tenth year
of his abandonment on Lemnos, but Scott lays out a considerable pre-history of his
Philoctetes, tracing the steps of his journey toward an equally harsh abandonment.
Scott first embroiders the father-son story of Hercules and Philoctetes in recounting
the poignant details of Duleep Kumar and his son Hari. Duleep, who leaves his home
in India to study law in England, only to fail miserably, is hardly a conqueror, yet a
herculean extravagance marks his dreams for Ha. 223 Duleep is determined to give the
boy an English public school education and to transform him into a proper Englishman,
complete with a westernized name ("Harry Coomer"). Once Harry possesses the
219 WILSON, The Wound, supra note 185, at 295.
220 In order of publication, the four books are: THE JEWEL IN THE CROWN (Avon Books
1979) (1966) [hereinafter SCOTT, THE JEWEL]; THE DAY OF THE SCORPION (Avon Books
1979) (1968) [hereinafter Scorr, THE DAY]; THE TOWERS OF SILENCE (Avon Books 1979)
(1971) [hereinafter SCOTT, THE TOWERS]; A DIVISION OF THE SPOILS (Avon Books 1979)
(1975) [hereinafter SCOTr, A DIVISION].
22' Eva Brann, Critical Discussion, Tapestry With Images: Paul Scott's Raj Novels, 23 PHIL.
&Lrr. 181, 187 (1999).
222 See SCOTr, A DIVISION, supra note 220, at 556-57.
223 The father-son relationship is detailed in ScoTr, THE JEWEL, supra note 220. On the
emotional extravagance of Hercules in legend and myth, see EDITH HAMILTON, MYTHOLOGY
224-43 (1942).
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linguistic and cultural formation of the British ruling class, Duleep imagines, the
youth will return to India as part of that class and assume a prominent position. Even
more than this desire for his son's success, Duleep wishes to give him the wholeness
of the English language itself. He muses to Harry:
English [unlike Hindi] is not spare. But it is beautiful. It cannot
be called truthful because its subtleties are infinite. It is the lan-
guage of a people who have probably earned their reputation for
perfidy and hypocrisy because their language itself is so flexible,
so often light-headed with statements which appear to mean one
thing one year and quite a different thing the next. At least, this
is so when it is written, and the English have usually confided their
noblest aspirations and intentions to paper. Written, it looks like
a way of gaining time and winning confidence."'
Duleep's plans for Harry proceed, but when finances fail, Duleep commits suicide;
his only legacy to Harry is the "sacred bow" of fluent English. It proves a handicap.
Harry's sole means of support are relatives in India, a place he has never known, a
sprawling diversity of peoples then witnessing Gandhi's anti-British "Quit India"
campaign and doing little to welcome a lost young man with dark skin, an English
accent, and a fondness for swing music of the 1930s.
In his effort to adjust to surroundings he finds wholly foreign, Coomer becomes
Kumar, working at a newspaper in a provincial city and encountering anti-British
sentiments all around, including those of a local activist who says that even the fish-
out-of-water Kumar might "learn to be a good Indian. 225 In letters to a cherished boy-
hood friend in England, Kumar ponders the concept of the "good Indian," using prose
that strains to discern the relation, if any, of self to citizenship for one so utterly dis-
placed. "I'm not sure I know what a good Indian is," he writes.226
Is he the fellow who joins the army (because it is a family
tradition to join the army), or the fellow who is rich enough and
ambitious enough to contribute money to Government War
Funds, or is he the rebellious fellow. . . ? Or is the good Indian
the Mahatma ... who last month .. .praised the French for
surrendering and wrote to the British cabinet asking them to...
let the Axis powers walk into Britain. ... [Or is he] the simple
peasant who is only interested in ridding himself of the burden
of the local money lender and becoming entitled to the whole of
whatever it is he grows?227
224 ScoTT, THE JEWEL, supra note 220, at 206.
225 Id. at 264.
226 Id.
227 Id. at 264-65.
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Of British assurances that self-rule is just around the corner, Kumar notes that similar
promises had been made for a hundred years but "were never fulfilled. 228 Kumar,
whose only interest as an English schoolboy was cricket, now finds a world in racial
upheaval; he begins to think that "[w]hat [the British] dislike [about Indian demands
for independence] is a black reflection of their own white radicalism which centuries
ago led to the Magna Carta., 29 Any hope for clarifying his situation, he realizes,
can only come from putting words on a page, yet even that act of probing experience
through speech brings limited results: "'Working on this paper has forced me to
look at the world and try to make sense out of it. But after I've looked at it I still ask
myself where I stand in relation to it and that is what puzzles me to know." 230
Real trouble for Sophocles's Philoctetes begins with a snake bite in a temple on
the way to Troy; for Kumar, the moment comes when he and his English girlfriend
- the observant, always questioning Daphne Manners - are assaulted by hooligans
in a public garden at night. Daphne is raped. Merrick, an English police officer whose
character blends the hardness, racism, and even the madness of the Raj, rearranges
evidence in order to accuse Kumar falsely of the crime. A repellant version of prag-
matic Odysseus, Merrick cannot accept the Englishness of a black man. He tortures
and molests Kumar in detention. This is Kumar's experience of Lemnos - abandon-
ment, violation, injustice, despair. Beyond the prison where Hari struggles to stay
sane, Daphne dies in childbirth.
Kumar's story haunts the four novels. English characters discuss it, replay it,
wonder what happened and why. Out of shame, some obtain his release and then
puzzle over his apparent disappearance into the vastness of India. An Englishman
who knew him in public school, trying to track him down a few years later, comes
across the column signed "Philoctetes" in an Indian newspaper. It is an extraordi-
narily moving piece of writing, showing growth well beyond the prosaic musings
of Kumar's earlier ruminations on the good Indian. The column surely fulfills old
Duleep's sense of the English language's subtlety, its facility for expressing "aspira-
tions," its tendency to stall for time. The column marks Kumar's true birth as a
writer - a birth that seemingly coincides with a Sophoclean truce with existence, an
acceptance of engagement, despite everything, with India and its future.
For Scott, then, the individual discarded by social forces moves tentatively back
to participation through self-discoveries of expression. Kumar's newspaper piece
ostensibly concerns the recent dedication of a college's new wing: he describes the
bareness of its still-unoccupied classrooms and labs, suggesting the smallness of its
beginning and uncertainty of its future.23' This is Kumar's metaphor for India at
independence: it too is empty and untested. Yet on another level, the writer surveys
his own stance as both member and onlooker of a society that he did not choose.
228 Id. at 265.
229 Id. at 266.
230 Id. at 267.
231 ScoTr, A DivisION, supra note 220, at 556-57.
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When he writes that as a reporter he had access to the new college wing because "[t]he
carpenters and the workemen assumed I was a member of the college staff and such
members of the staff as I encountered assumed I was connected with the builders," 23 2
he refers to his impossible status as neither Anglo nor Indian but one mistaken for
both. When he says he "faced dangers" in walking through the unfinished building,
but visited classrooms "unmolested," and left the building "subdued" by thought,
the experience of detention and abuse are just beneath the surface of his prose. 233
But his art gives him oxygen; it allows him to order his knowledge of chaos, and
like his counterparts in Sophocles and Heaney, he separates spirit from wound. Of
the new school building, he notes its dependence "on what as yet unproven teachers
and as yet unadmitted students must make of it and give to it before they can take
anything lasting away from it. '234 Civic responsibility, including the contribution
of those, like him, with every right to turn their backs, will determine any success that
India achieves. And then, in a final paragraph of surpassing beauty, he remembers
"another place" - England and his youth - with its "seemingly long endless summers
and the shade of different kinds of trees," as well as the winter bareness of branches
that should have taught him the illusion of all promises. 235 The wound remains, yet
he must take part; his individuality, discovered in a form of writing about the self
and its uneasy armistice with the political world, requires it. He retains the sacred
bow of speech and bargains that it will suffice.
The Philoctetes stories suggest the outlines of a speech process within the zone
of negative liberty that may occur in the modem context - considered here as the
situation of citizens caught between alienation from politics perceived as closed or cor-
rupt, on the one hand, and a readiness for engagement, based on a received tradition
of participatory duty, on the other. Sophocles's account teaches that when a break-
down in fundamental civic values is widely perceived, the alienated citizen may see
her way back to civic participation if the law acts to reform or repair, even at the
cost of some freedom. Heaney stresses the energies of untrammeled expression and
its effect on the alienated mind's resumption of interest and involvement in a system
that claims to be self-governing. Scott focuses not on state-made repairs, or the vitality
of expressive media external to the person, but on the speaker himself, for whom
speech becomes a means of discerning one's history in a way that opens up con-
nection to political society. The citizen's uncoerced movement in the direction of
participation is an essential element of the broader societal dynamic envisioned by
232 Id.
233 Id. at 557.
234 id.
235 Id. Kumar's use of the tree branch as an emblem of the spare consciousness that
survives painful human experience revises a decidedly more consoling use of the tree image
in John Stuart Mill's On Liberty. MiLL, supra note 60, at 60 ("Human nature is not a machine
to be built after a model, and set to do exactly the work prescribed for it, but a tree, which
requires to grow and develop itself on all sides, according to the tendency of the inward forces
which make it a living thing.").
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Dimova-Cookson, the theory that an interaction of positive and negative liberties
releases moral agency in civic affairs.
In Part IV below, the Article returns to its original question: what divides the
justices in First Amendment cases? It considers the possibility that competing
camps have differing interpretations of which means of restoring participation, and
hence promoting self-governance, seems most workable and promising in a given
context.
IV. FOUR CASES: WHAT DIVIDES THE JUSTICES?
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission... exhibited a clash of understandings
about how the law of the First Amendment should facilitate self-governance. A
state law prohibited the distribution of anonymous political leaflets intended to in-
fluence voters.237 Despite receiving cautions about the law, an Ohio woman handed
out unsigned leaflets on an issue scheduled for referendum.23 The state elections
board charged Mrs. McIntyre with violating the law and fined her one hundred
dollars. 239 The court of common pleas reversed, ruling that the statute was unconsti-
tutional as applied, since Mrs. McIntyre had done nothing to mislead the public or
otherwise behave surreptitiously. 240 The court of appeals reinstated the fine, how-
ever, and the state supreme court affirmed in a divided vote, finding the statute a
"'minor requirement"' designed to achieve legitimate goals: to help voters "'evaluate
[the] validity"' of campaign literature, and to help state officials "'identify those
who engage in fraud, libel or false advertising.' '24 1 The state high court's majority
applied a test of reasonableness.242 In contrast, the dissent called for a "more severe
standard because of [the statute's] significant effect 'on the ability of individual
citizens to freely express their views in writing on political issues."'243
Judicial disagreement over the case continued in the United States Supreme
Court, where a six-justice majority overruled the Ohio Supreme Court.2" Four
justices wrote: Justice Stevens for the majority; Justice Ginsburg, concurring in the
decision; Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment; and Justice Scalia, dissenting 4"
Justice Stevens's opinion for the Court conformed to traditional analytic structure:
236 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
237 Id. at 338 n.3 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.09(A) (1988)).
238 Id. at 338.
239 id.
240 Id. at 339.
241 Id. at 339-40 (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 618 N.E.2d 152, 155-56
(Ohio 1993)).
242 Id. at 340.
23 Id. (quoting McIntyre, 618 N.E.2d at 156-57 (Wright, J., dissenting)).
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",246first declaring that the leaflet was "the essence of First Amendment expression,
then that the statute was a content-based regulation of pure political speech,247 and
third that "'exacting scrutiny"' 248 was the standard of review necessary to ensure self-
governance "[iun a republic where the people are sovereign." 249 Justice Stevens
explicitly referenced New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and its affirmation of "our
'profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.""'25 Once the case had been organized and
contextualized this way, the statute could not, and did not, survive. 25' However,
only at the beginning and end of the opinion did Justice Stevens signal his value-
based orientation to the case. At the outset he noted "a respected tradition of anon-
ymity in the advocacy of political causes, ' 252 and at the end, he took the point further,
stating that the First Amendment protects anonymous speech in order "to protect
unpopular individuals from retaliation - and their ideas from suppression - at the
hand of an intolerant society." '53 Recognizing the reality of alienation in the face
of intolerance, Stevens again appeared to take the cue from Sullivan, this time its
concern for the speaker's dignity and the threat against it posed by vindictive social
forces. But as discussed in Part L.A with respect to Sullivan, the dignity model of
self-governance has only so much intellectual force in a speech case. To be sure,
Sullivan implicated the compelling goal of equality, but its ultimate emphasis on
autonomy stopped short of the process account's concern for citizenship, in the
sense of the individual's finding a place in the larger political whole and participat-
ing in it actively. Dignity is prior to participation; it may not be adequate to fuel the
democratic dynamic associated with citizenship. In nullifying the Ohio statute's
disclosure requirement, the Court in McIntyre privileged the speaker's autonomy to
say only as much as she chooses to say about an issue for election, but the Court
took little note that anonymity could work against the goal of open deliberation
among citizens.
If we evaluate Justice Stevens's opinion from the perspective of a process model,
we begin with the concept of "social process" derived from Dimova-Cookson' s work
on liberty.254 A social process reading of the Stevens opinion would note its ex-
tension of the handbill distributor's negative liberty in order to create conditions for
246 Id. at 347.
247 Id. at 345.
248 Id. at 347.
249 id.
250 Id. at 346 (quoting 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
251 The state's interest in providing relevant information to voters was deemed "plainly
insufficient." Id. at 349. The Court thought that other statutory provisions more directly
addressed the state's interest in preventing libel and fraud, id. at 349-51, and that the restric-
tion covered too much speech unrelated to libel and fraud, id. at 351-53. The statute was a
"blunderbuss approach" to a problem better treated otherwise. Id. at 357.
252 Id. at 343.
253 Id. at 357.
254 See supra text accompanying notes 144-70.
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uncoerced moral agency on the part of any who would receive the handbill, consider
its content, and incorporate it into a decision on whether and how to take part in the
referendum. But the social process account requires the desired causal effect of
expanding negative liberty to be at least plausible, and here it is not. As noted in
Part H, plausibility in the social process account is tied to trust, that lubricant of the
speech process that gives it practical force. It is hard to see an opening for the trust
necessary for moral action by recipients of electioneering speech when distributors
of that speech can remain nameless. Mrs. McIntyre may well insist that a right to
anonymity ensures her preparation and circulation of the handbill in the first place,
thus adding to the store of political information generally. Nonetheless, it is doubtful
that permitting speakers to avoid all named responsibility for the information they
circulate can strengthen the moral agency of recipients to undertake responsibility
for social conditions.
Thus, whether Stevens's opinion followed the substantive dignity model or the
social process model, his opinion for the Court fell short of convincingly advancing
self-governance. Justice Ginsburg, concurring, reached the same result,255 but it
appears that she employed the "individual process" model in Scott's self-discovery
mode, emphasizing the citizen's own interest in locating a role in community life
through unburdened speech.256 Noting that "Margaret McIntyre's case... bears a
marked resemblance to Margaret Gilleo's case and Mary Grace' s," 25 7 Justice Ginsburg
relied on precedent respecting idiosyncratic participation, whether placing a political
sign in the front yard or picketing on a public sidewalk. By recalling these speakers
by name, Justice Ginsburg recognized the connection between civic speech and
identity itself, between participation and personhood. But her concurring remarks
were too brief to signal anything more definite about the content of this model.
Justice Scalia, dissenting, also appeared to follow an "individual process" model,
although as a Sophoclean. His opinion invoked the effect of systemic reform, how-
ever modest, in aiding civic participation, in contrast to Justice Ginsburg's opinion,
which sought to further participation by eliminating constraints on speech. Scalia
would have upheld the Ohio statute on the basis of a presumption of constitutionality
created by the states' "long, accepted usage" of disclosure statutes of this kind. 258 He
also gave customary doctrinal reasons: the electoral context permits greater speech
regulation than other contexts; the "right to anonymity" has no special place in
American jurisprudence; and elected officials arguably have greater competence
than courts to decide whether mandatory disclosure "is effective in protecting and
enhancing democratic elections. '"259
255 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 358 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
256 See supra Part III.C.
257 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 358 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing City of Ladue v. Gilleo,
512 U.S. 43 (1994); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983)).
258 Id. at 375 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
259 Id. at 378-81.
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Justice Scalia stressed the governmental objective: "a civil and dignified level
of campaign debate - which the State has no power to command, but ample power
to encourage by such undemanding measures as a signature requirement." 2" Here
he touched on roots of citizen alienation, noting:
Observers of the past few national elections have expressed con-
cern about the increase of character assassination - "mudsling-
ing" is the colloquial term - engaged in by political candidates
and their supporters to the detriment of the democratic process....
Imagine how much all of this would increase if it could be done
anonymously.... Consider, moreover .... "dirty tricks."...
How much easier - and sanction free! - it would be to
circulate anonymous material (for example, a really tasteless,
though not actionably false, attack upon one's own candidate)
with the hope and expectation that it will be attributed to, and
held against, the other side.26'
It is this perception of "mudslinging" that arguably keeps citizens from both political
dialogue and the voting booths, justifying their retreat into private concerns. The
signing requirement responded to this problem, and Justice Scalia implicitly credited
its role in curbing loss of faith in the system and consequent declines in participation.
In rejecting the applicability of precedent striking down "right of reply" statutes
applicable to newspapers, Justice Scalia provided further evidence of an "individual
process" approach to the case. He explained:
[I]t is not usual for a speaker to put forward the best arguments
against himself, and it is a great imposition upon free speech to
make him do so. Whereas it is quite usual - it is expected -
for a speaker to identify himself, and requiring that is (at least
where there are no special circumstances present) virtually no
imposition at all.262
He concluded by decrying the notion that anonymity is "traditionally sacrosanct. 263
For Scalia, "[iut facilitates wrong by eliminating accountability, which is ordinarily
the very purpose of the anonymity. '"2" Concerned that the Court's holding approved
a practice that "will lead to a coarsening of the future," Scalia voted to uphold the
statute.265
260 Id. at 382.
261 Id. at 382-83.
262 Id. at 383.
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The dissent, then, followed what we have called the Sophoclean "individual
process" model. Just as Sophocles linked the alienated man's return to civic life to
the words of a bedrock authority (Hercules), Scalia linked a less coarsened politics
- and the renewed participation of the individual exhausted with "mudslinging" -
to the wisdom of another bedrock authority: the forty-nine states that had signing
requirements. 2  On this view, the case involved a modest but not negligible
response to a larger political problem, a partial solution sensibly related to improv-
ing the "quality" of electoral campaigns. Although Scalia did not write in broad
terms indicative of the "social process" model suggested by Dimova-Cookson's
work, the dissent could comfortably fit into that schema as well. His approach
accepted the positive liberty of a signing requirement on the theory that it promotes
greater negative freedom, in the sense of less voter confusion caused by unaccount-
able information, less alienation from traditional forms of voter participation, and
in the long run a greater liberty resulting from increased voter vigilance over who
makes the laws and what the laws provide.
All in all, the dissent for these reasons was a remarkable meditation on speech
and citizenship. It recognized that a signing requirement, while a restriction, was
far from a significant diminishment of negative liberty, that the moral agency it
promoted was salutary, and that the democratic contributions of a right to be anony-
mous were negligible at best - and more likely pernicious.
In sum, Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Scalia did not differ on the First Amend-
ment value at stake in McIntyre. They agreed that it is the self-governance value.
Their disagreement arose from dwelling on different aspects of self-governance. For
Stevens, the Brennan-bestowed, dignity-driven, substantive value mattered most.
For Ginsburg, the speaker-focused, "individual process" value was central. And Scalia
gave prominence to the system-focused "individual process" value. Although these
differences were important, the justices gave little sign of grasping their divisions.
Several years later, in Bartnicki v. Vopper, the Court addressed a lawsuit brought
by union officials whose private cell-phone conversation about a contentious labor
negotiation was intercepted and recorded by an unknown person.267 The interceptor
delivered a tape of the call to one of the union's opponents, who delivered it to a
talk-radio host, who broke no law in receiving it but had reason to know it had been
illegally intercepted.258 The radio station broadcast the taped conversation some
months later.269 The union officials sued the radio host, among others, under federal
and state statutory provisions aimed at protecting the privacy of electronic com-
munications.27 The question before the Supreme Court was whether the First
266 ld. at 381-82.
267 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
268 Id.
269 Id.
270 Id. at 519-20.
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Amendment prohibited imposing civil damages for airing the illegally intercepted
telephone conversation."' The case was complicated by the fact that the conver-
sation included angry remarks about the plaintiffs' opponents in the labor dispute,
including statements about doing violence to them.272
The Court held 6-3 that the statutes as applied to the radio host violated the First
Amendment because the phone conversation consisted of "truthful information of
public concern., 273 Justice Stevens again wrote for the Court, although a concurrence
by Justice Breyer (joined by Justice O'Connor) emphasized the narrowness of the
holding.274 Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas.
Justice Stevens's majority opinion followed the pattern of his opinion in
McIntyre.275 He invoked a First Amendment framework and perfunctorily applied
it. On difficult elements - for example, whether the information involved a public
issue, and whether it was lawfully obtained by the broadcaster - the analysis was
highly technical and even counter-intuitive. He then considered whether imposition
of damages for the broadcast was a narrowly tailored means of serving a compelling
state interest, and he concluded that it was not.2 76 As in McIntyre, his analysis in
Bartnicki ultimately gave way to comments on value, and he cited Sullivan277 to sup-
port a privilege for public speech, regardless of its dubious gathering by "a stranger."
278
However, Justice Stevens made little effort to relate this disposition to Sullivan's
equality-based dignity rationale, and it would be difficult to do so in a context of an
intercepted phone conversation leading to a stark invasion of privacy. Despite its
271 Id. at 524-25.
272 Id. at 518-19.
273 Id. at 534.
274 Id. at 535-36 (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating agreement with the Court's "narrow hold-
ing limited to the special circumstances present here: (1) the radio broadcasters acted lawfully
(up to the time of final public disclosure); and (2) the information publicized involved a matter
of unusual public concern, namely, a threat of potential physical harm to others"). The concur-
rence prompted Professor Smolla's observation that "Justice Stevens's opinion is more aptly
described as a four-justice plurality decision, a decision that is quite sharply and dramatically
constrained by the limiting language in the Breyer and O'Connor concurrence." Rodney A.
Smolla, Information as Contraband: The First Amendment and Liability for Trafficking in
Speech, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 1099, 1114 (2002).
275 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
276 The state interests in imposing damages on the broadcaster - "removing an incentive
for parties to intercept private conversations, and ... minimizing the harm to persons whose
conversations have been illegally intercepted" - were not adequate under the First
Amendment. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 529. The first end could justify imposing penalties on the
interceptor, but not the broadcaster who neither intercepted the conversation nor violated a
law in receiving the tape. Id. at 529-30. The second end, in the Court's view, was stronger
yet ultimately insufficient in this case because the information involved a matter of public
concern. Id. at 533-34.
277 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
278 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 534-35.
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invocation of Sullivan, casting the Bartnicki majority opinion in terms of a sub-
stantive self-governance analysis did not, and will not, work.
Justice Stevens's invocation of Sullivan could suggest a "social process" account
in the sense derived from Dimova-Cookson. On this analysis, the Court would protect
the negative liberty of the radio host to air the telephone conversation, on the theory
that a broadcast that is not intentionally false enhances the marketplace of ideas and
contributes to the exercise of moral agency (positive liberty) by recipients. Here, un-
like the scenario in McIntyre, the element of trust is not lacking; the information,
however intrusively obtained, is presumably accurate and, in that sense, trustworthy.
However, on the "individual process" level, it is difficult to see how the freedom to
broadcast an illegally intercepted private phone call, even if its content involves a
public matter, can awaken moral agency in an alienated or apathetic citizen. Strong
distaste for the method of information gathering and a deep skepticism about taking
literally the contents of a private telephone call of this kind, would likely undermine
any chance of increasing participation.
The Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and Thomas, on the other hand, did appear
to see the case in "individual process" terms - not in the Sophoclean, system-
repairing mode associated earlier with Justice Scalia' s dissent in McIntyre,279 but in
Scott's self-discovery mode: removing constraints on speakers to the extent possible
in order to permit them to negotiate individual connections to society through speech.
How did the dissent do this in upholding sanctions against the radio host's speech?
The dissent followed Scott by focusing not on the talk show's broadcast but on the
private conversation that triggered the dispute in the first place. Besides strongly
opposing the majority's doctrinal analysis, the Chief Justice castigated the majority's
willingness to chill private speech, the telephone communication between two citi-
zens. 80 The dissent cited approvingly a 1967 presidential report that stated:
In a democratic society privacy of communication is essential if
citizens are to think and act creatively and constructively. Fear or
suspicion that one's speech is being monitored by a stranger, even
without the reality of such activity, can have a seriously inhibiting
effect upon the willingness to voice critical and constructive ideas.28'
Here the dissent recognized a connection between the citizen's privacy and her civic
participation; unburdened conversation in the private realm directly related to the
individual's capacity to bring well-conceived, constructive input to the public
marketplace and thus to find a place in public dialogue.
279 See supra text accompanying notes 258-66.
280 Barnicki, 532 U.S. at 553-54 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
281 Id. at 543 (citation omitted).
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As in McIntyre, then, the justices in Bartnicki agreed on the over-arching value,
self-governance, but divided in terms of emphasis. The majority opted either for a
weak substantive-value approach or for the "social process" approach, and the
dissent conceptualized the case in terms of "individual process." This split suggests
that the left-of-center justices were more concerned with increased participation con-
sidered in terms of broad social effects (McIntyre, Bartnicki), while the right-of-center
justices regarded First Amendment disputes in terms of responding to systemic break-
down (McIntyre) or protecting individual creative development (Bartnicki).
In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,282 the judicial roles changed. Justice
Scalia wrote for the majority, opting for the "individual process" account, focusing
on the flow of information as Justice Stevens did in the two prior cases. For his part,
Justice Stevens took the Sophoclean position that Justice Scalia shouldered in McIntyre,
perceiving (albeit with precious little evidence) a broken system and a sensibly re-
strictive solution. Justice Ginsburg fleshed out this approach.
White involved a judicial election in Minnesota and the state's code of judicial
conduct. 283 The code's Announce Clause provided that "a 'candidate for a judicial
office, including an incumbent judge,' shall not 'announce his or her views on dis-
puted legal or political issues."284 Steep sanctions applied: a violating incumbent
judge faced a spectrum of penalties, "including removal, censure, civil penalties, and
suspension without pay., 285 A lawyer who ran for judicial office and violated the
clause could be disbarred, suspended, or put on probation. 286 After a judicial candi-
date sought and failed to received clear advice from a state enforcement board as to
the scope of the clause, the candidate sued the board in federal district court, seeking
a declaratory order that the clause violated the First Amendment. 287 Both the trial
court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the clause's
constitutionality. 28
8
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Announce Clause violated the
First Amendment. 289 First, although courts had interpreted the clause narrowly in order
to rid it of constitutional problems, Justice Scalia had trouble taking seriously the
altered law and was unconvinced that the saving interpretations significantly reduced
its reach.2" Even as narrowed, the clause
282 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
283 id.
284 Id. at 768 (quoting MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2000)).
285 Id.
286 Id.
287 White, 536 U.S. 765.
288 Id.
289 id.
290 Id. at 772-73.
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prohibit[ed] a judicial candidate from stating his views on any
specific nonfanciful legal question within the province of the
court for which he is running, except in the context of discussing
past decisions - and in the latter context as well, if he expresses
the view that he is not bound by stare decisis.
291
Justice Scalia noted as well that the state board had "printed a list of preapproved
questions which judicial candidates [were] allowed to answer." '292 This rendition of
the facts strongly signaled the Justice's sense that an Orwellian speech code, en-
forced by a board with power to disbar, governed Minnesota's judicial elections.
Applying strict scrutiny, Justice Scalia found fatal problems with both the
adequacy of the state interests and the narrowness of the Announce Clause as a means
of achieving them.293 His additional, perhaps greater, concern was that the state had
"set[] our First Amendment jurisprudence on its head" by abridging the right of can-
didates "to speak out on disputed issues .... to voters during an election., 294 Even
if many observers deemed merit selection of judges preferable to popular election,
Minnesota had maintained "the principle of elections in place while preventing
candidates from discussing what the elections are about."'2 95 The state simply could
not "tap the energy and the legitimizing power of the democratic process" without
according free speech to "participants in that process. ' '296
This opinion was surely consistent with a "social process" reading derived from
Dimova-Cookson. By increasing the negative liberty of judicial candidates to address
issues of their choice, the Court facilitated an increased flow of highly relevant
information to voters, assisting voters in the exercise of moral agency, if they chose
to exercise it.2 97 The trustworthiness of the judicial information could not be in
doubt, since it came from the candidates' own mouths. Whether it is desirable to
291 Id. at 773.
292 Id. at 774.
293 The state interests were "preserving the impartiality of the state judiciary and pre-
serving the appearance of the impartiality of the state judiciary." Id. at 775. The state linked
the first interest to due process and the second to public confidence in the judiciary. Id.
Justice Scalia found that the Announce Clause, which "does not restrict speech for or against
particular parties, but rather speech for or against particular issues," was not narrowly
tailored to serve either of the state interests. Id. at 776-77. To the extent that the state interests
involved guaranteeing litigants "an equal chance to persuade the court on the legal points in
their case," Justice Scalia found the interests not even compelling. Id. at 777. He doubted that
a state interest was to preserve open-mindedness because on that score the Announce Clause
was patently underinclusive. Id. at 780.
294 Id. at 781-82.
295 Id. at 788.
296 Id.
297 Cf. Richard Briffault, Judicial Campaign Codes After Republican Party of Minnesota
v. White, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 181, 196 (2004) (noting that "restrictions [on speech ofjudicial
candidates] may make it more difficult to get the public interested in judicial campaigns").
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have judicial elections in the first place is a separate question. But elections in our
tradition cannot easily go hand-in-hand with speech supervised for candidates by gov-
ernment rules.
In invoking "the energy and the legitimizing power of the democratic process,"298
the Court followed an "individual process" model as well: the Heaney model of com-
munication as bond-among-citizens. Permitting expressive freedom of judicial candi-
dates not only informs the individual voter but, like much issue-related information,
provides a currency for argument among citizens on where society is going. The con-
versational bond can, on this view, spark a disaffected citizen to reconsider engage-
ment. Justice Kennedy's concurrence in White supplemented this essential theme with
the idea that permitting candidates to speak freely can prompt citizens to respond
with speech of their own, particularly speech aimed at reaching "voters who are un-
interested or uninformed or blinded by partisanship."2 99 Accepting that a state "cannot
opt for an elected judiciary and then assert that its democracy, in order to work as
desired, compels the abridgement of speech, ' '3°° yet recognizing that "judicial cam-
paigns in age of frenetic fund-raising and mass media" can heighten alienation and "dis-
respect for the legal system,"'" Kennedy would rely on "democracy and free speech"
to be "their own correctives."3° Kennedy's view came close to Heaney' s faith in crea-
tive solutions arising from the always risky "fission and fusion" of people talking.
Four justices signed two separate dissents declaring that the Court had "exag-
gerate[d] the reach of the Announce Clause," "ignore[d] the significance of that
provision to the [state's] integrated system of judicial campaign regulation,, 30 3 and
undervalued the differences between judicial and political campaigns. 304 Respond-
ing to Justice Kennedy's point that speech of press, academy, groups, and citizens
was the proper check on inappropriate speech by judicial candidates, Justice Stevens
grudgingly stated, "If the solution to harmful speech must be more speech, so be
it. '"305 But he insisted that the majority had mistakenly ignored the difference
between types of elections. 31 Justice Ginsburg stressed the state's compelling in-
terest in "preserving the public's confidence in the integrity and impartiality of its
judiciary,"3 °7 an interest that made it permissible for the state, in her view, to "install[]
an election process geared to the judicial office."3 8 Both dissents therefore followed
the Sophoclean "individual process" model, willingly subordinating a limited amount
298 White, 536 U.S. at 788.
299 Id. at 795 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
300 Id.
301 Id. at 794.
302 Id. at 795.
303 Id. at 812 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
304 Id. at 797-98 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 803-04 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
305 Id. at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
306 id.
37 Id. at 817 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
308 Id. at 805.
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of speech to systemic repair as a means of bolstering civic faith and participation.
However, neither dissent could document the existence or effects of a real threat
needing repair - or one that plausibly related to candidates' speech.
White leaves the impression that one "individual process" approach that was not
followed - the self-discovery model associated above with Scott's Indian Philoctetes
- may well have been the most appropriate. As Justice Scalia indicated, the judicial
candidate navigating the Announce Clause as written and as interpreted had a hard
time knowing what to say to voters in an election.3" The candidate's statements
would either be nonsensical or terribly convoluted. Perhaps the unseen value in this
case is the candidate's interest in self-discovery as a public citizen during a judicial
election campaign - an interest in finding the proper judicial stance between detach-
ment and engagement. Justice Kennedy came close to this model when he cited
Benjamin Cardozo's self-examining book about judging, The Nature of the Judicial
Process,310 and then remarked about what elected judges discover living with the
law: "Many [elected judges], despite the difficulties imposed by the election system,
have discovered in the law the enlightenment, instruction, and inspiration that make
them independent-minded and faithful jurists of real integrity." 311 If part of this dis-
covery takes place as a candidate, then Scott's self-discovery model, protecting speech
to the fullest extent possible, arguably comes into play.
The fourth case that spurred this Article is McConnell v. Federal Election Com-
mission,312 which reviewed Congress's mammoth new campaign finance law. The
Court fragmented again, but the White majority lost Justice O'Connor. On many of
the provisions at issue, the Court voted 5-4 to uphold the legislation. A key issue
in the case was the constitutionality of statutory restrictions on non-candidate-paid
political advertisements that are disseminated by broadcast, cable, or satellite, run
"in close proximity to a federal election," and "clearly identify a federal candidate
" See id. at 769 (majority opinion).
310 Id. at 794 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting BENJAMINN. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921)).
311 Id. at 796.
312 540 U.S. 93 (2003). The Court described a Senate Committee's
six-volume report summarizing the results of an extensive investigation
into the campaign practices in the 1996 federal elections. The report
gave particular attention to the effect of soft money on the American
political system, including elected officials' practice of granting special
access in return for political contributions.... One Senator stated that
"the hearings provided overwhelming evidence that the twin loopholes
of soft money and bogus issue advertising have virtually destroyed our
campaign finance laws, leaving us with little more than a pile of legal
rubble."
Id. at 129-30. The lower court opinion in McConnell contains a history of the legislation,
noting that "[tihe overhaul of our Nation's existing campaign finance laws - culminating
with the enactment of [the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002] - would consume the
attention of three separate Congresses and require navigation through atypical parliamentary
procedures." McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176,202 (D.D.C. 2003)
(footnote omitted).
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and are targeted to that candidate's electorate."'3 13 Title II of the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) prohibits unions and corporations from using their
general treasury funds to finance such advertisements, defined as "electioneering
communication[s]. '314 Congress passed the measure to address a problem that had
intensified beginning in the 1996 presidential campaign:3 5 that pre-existing law did
not cover non-candidate broadcast advertisements unless the ads contained so-called
"magic words" signaling that the ads constituted "express advocacy" of a candidate.31 6
With the pre-existing law's blessing, unions and corporations had developed the
practice of foregoing the "magic words," thus escaping the letter of the law, and
airing unregulated "issue advertisements" that had identical or greater impact.31 7 Many
in Congress, declaring that issue ads were the equivalent of "poison politics 31 8 and that
the government's interest in "'limit[ing] the actuality and appearance of corruption'" 319
had been validated in a line of Supreme Court cases, decided to do something about
them. Title Id of BCRA made it a felony for unions and corporations to finance the
ads within sixty days of a federal election or within thirty days of a primary.320
A special three-judge district court held that the ban on funding the ads from gen-
eral treasury funds was constitutional?2 A dissenting judge, quoting the well-known
Sullivan phrase, would have struck down the ban on the ground that the First Amend-
ment "delegates to the populace at large the responsibility of conducting an 'uninhib-
ited, robust, and wide-open' debate about government affairs and political candidates. 322
The Supreme Court upheld Title II as well. The Court's opinion, authored by
Justices O'Connor and Stevens, took a decidedly Sophoclean approach under the
"individual process" model, relying on a record that they determined amply war-
ranted subordinating speech to larger systemic reform. The Court recalled the still
persuasive rationales for earlier reform legislation: that substantial financial support
for candidates in effect purchases "'access,'" and "'that the feeling that big contribu-
tors gain special treatment produces a reaction that the average American has no
313 McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 592 (opinion of Kollar-Kotelly, J.).
314 2 U.S.C.A. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i) (Supp. 2005). See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 189-90. BCRA
permits funding of such ads through "separate segregated fund[s]," 2 U.S.C.A. § 441b(b)(2)(C),
which are subject to the limitations contained in the Federal Election Campaign Act, e.g., 2
U.S.C.A. § 441a(l)(C).
315 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 131 (noting increase in funds spent on issue ads in 1996).
316 McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 792 (opinion of Leon, J.). See McConnell, 540 U.S. at
126 (noting that under the strict reading of the Court in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 n.52
(1976), "a bright statutory line separat[ed] 'express advocacy' from 'issue advocacy').
317 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 126-27.
318 Id. at 260 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Sen. Wellstone).
319 Id. at 120 (majority opinion) (citation omitted).
320 Id. at 204. See also id. at 323 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (referencing "severe criminal
penalties for broadcasting advocacy messages that 'refe[r] to a clearly identified candidate"').
321 McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 185 (summarizing holdings).
322 Id. at 360 (Henderson, J., dissenting) (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14 (quoting N.Y. Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964))).
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significant role in the political process.' "323 For the McConnell majority, Congress
legitimately kept these goals in mind in BCRA, seeking "to confine the ill effects of
aggregated wealth on our political system. '324 The Court found interests of the "high-
est importance": "' [p]reserving the integrity of the electoral process, preventing cor-
ruption, and "sustain[ing] the active, alert responsibility of the individual citizen in a
democracy for the wise conduct of the government."' 32 From this perspective, self-
governance is possible only when citizens perceive the efficacy of participation. If
government is essentially closed to all but the financially well-off, citizens give up.
326
The dissenting justices had no disagreement that self-governance was at stake,
but they saw self-governance as imperiled, not promoted, by the statute. For the
dissenters, Heaney' s "individual process" model, emphasizing the free flow of infor-
mation to citizens seeking to inform themselves and jointly deliberate, counseled
invalidation of the Act. Justice Scalia, stating that "[t]his is a sad day for freedom
of speech," assailed the majority's decision for "cut[ting] to the heart of what the
First Amendment is meant to protect: the right to criticize the government. '327 Scalia' s
position was that disclosure requirements were the constitutional means of addressing
the fact of "amassed wealth" in the political system. 321 With respect to electioneer-
ing communications, disclosure requirements would "tell the people where the speech
is coming from," thus comporting with the "premise of the First Amendment" that
"people are neither sheep nor fools, and hence fully capable of considering both the
substance of the speech presented to them and its proximate and ultimate source....
Given the premises of democracy, there is no such thing as too much speech. 329
Noting that supporters of the limitations on advertisements openly objected to the
ads' contents, he deplored the legislative effort to prohibit criticism of government.330
323 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 119 n.5 (recapping appellate decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 519
F.2d 821, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc), which cited statements of U.S. Senator Charles
Mathias). See also id. at 150-54 (discussing legislative concern about access peddling as
legitimate rationale for BCRA, and concluding that "[i]t was not unwarranted for Congress
to conclude that the selling of access gives rise to the appearance of corruption."). Justice
Kennedy questioned the interest in curbing access as a legitimate justification under the Court's
precedent. Id. at 294-95 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
324 Id. at 224 (majority opinion).
325 Id. at 206 n.88 (alterations in original) (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 788-89 (citations and footnotes omitted)).
326 For an interesting account of the "credulity" of the majority in taking "an unrealis-
tically rosy view of how campaign finance has worked and therefore how BCRA will work,"
see Roy A. Schotland, Act : BCRA Wins in Congress. Act II: BCRA Wins Big at the Court.
Act III: BCRA Loses to Reality, 3 ELECTION L.J. 335, 336 (2004). For the observation that
Justice O'Connor, "perceived as the deciding vote in the case," was "the one Justice with
practical experience as a politician," and that "the extensive record of unsavory fundraising
practices reflected a believable reality to her," see Ellen L. Weintraub, Perspectives on
Corruption, 3 ELECTION L.J. 355, 356 (2004).
327 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 248 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
328 Id. at 258.
329 Id. at 258-59.
330 id. at 260. "The first instinct of power is the retention of power, and, under a Consti-
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Justice Kennedy also sharply disagreed with the majority, particularly with the
sufficiency of the government rationale for Title I, that electioneering communica-
tions purchased by unions and corporations with general treasury funds would "'en-
dea[r] those entities to elected officials in a way that could be perceived by the pub-
lic as corrupting. ,, 33' For Kennedy, the rationale had "no limiting principle" and would
justify "outlaw[ing] even pure issue ads, because they, too, could endear their sponsors
to candidates who adopt the favored positions. 332 Kennedy urged the Court to resist
"ced[ing] authority to the Legislature to do with the First Amendment as it pleases. ' 33
These are strong words and should be taken seriously. But McConnell resists
confident assessment that either side was clearly right on First Amendment law or
value. The symbolism of BCRA was immense: Americans followed its proponents,
especially Senator McCain, on the evening news for years as he and others pushed
the legislation through Congress. Its eventual passage assumed the cultural image
of a victory for good government and improved civic participation. In the wake of
McConnell, Senator McCain put it simply - BCRA's goal was
to restore the American people's faith that their government be-
longs to them, and not only to those who can afford enormous pay-
ments to parties and candidates. That faith, badly damaged these
past years, is the indispensable element of a working democracy.
tution that requires periodic elections, that is best achieved by the suppression of election-
time speech." Id. at 263. Justice Scalia's dissent parallels academic commentary arguing that
"a legislatively enacted regulation on campaign spending and speaking would likely repre-
sent the outcome of self-interested political dealing and would result in a deliberate sovereign
incursion on the formal political freedom of those whose speaking and spending it limited."
Lillian R. BeVier, The Issue of Issue Advocacy: An Economic, Political, and Constitutional
Analysis, 85 VA. L. REv. 1761, 1765 (1999). Professor BeVier has also argued that the sur-
vival of BCRA's restrictions on electioneering communications in McConnell contradicts
Sullivan's protection of speech critical of government officials. She writes:
In its willingness carefully to evaluate the likely effects on the quantity
of speech of the legal rule it was evaluating, in its understanding that
quantity and openness of debate required freedom and that freedom
requires tolerance of false statements, and in its recognition of how impor-
tant it is to representative democracy that citizens be free to criticize their
government, [Sullivan] embodies a different First Amendment from that
embodied in McConnell.
Lillian R. BeVier, McConnell v. FEC: NotSenatorBuckley's First Amendment, 3 ELECTION
L.J. 127, 144 (2004). Justice Scalia's dissent, in exploring the meaning of the legislation
through the prism of political power, is reminiscent of his earlier dissent in Morrison v. Olson,
487 U.S. 654 (1988), where he argued strenuously that the independent counsel provisions
of the Ethics in Government Act were unconstitutional violations of the separation of powers.
Id. at 697-734 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
"3 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 329 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting the government's position
as recapped by one of the judges on the lower court panel, McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n,
251 F. Supp. 2d 176,622-23 (D.D.C. 2003) (opinion of Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (alteration in original).
332 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 329 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
333 Id. at 330.
1304 [Vol. 14:1251
SPEECH AND THE SELF-GOVERNANCE VALUE
Without it, citizens' incentive to participate in the civic life of
their own nation will shrink to the vanishing point.334
Richard L. Hasen persuasively writes that McConnell contains unmistakable "signs
of the Court's acceptance of the participatory self-government rationale ' 335 devel-
oped by Justice Breyer.336
The majority opinions in the lower court and Supreme Court, however, are not
rigorous First Amendment opinions in the sense that Sullivan, or even McIntyre,
Bartnicki, or White applied searching scrutiny to government rules arguably vio-
lating the First Amendment. 337 Perhaps First Amendment cases should not be the
sole precedents to emphasize in evaluating McConnell. Another interpretation would
consider McConnell as the First Amendment analogue ofMorrison v. Olson,338 which
in 1988 took a strikingly functionalist approach to separation of powers doctrine in
upholding 8-1 the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government
Act.33 9 As in Morrison, the justices in the McConnell majority were willing to defer
in large measure to Congress's judgment on how to regulate potential corruption in
politics. Perhaps both cases constitute a new kind of political question analysis.
Both involved statutes addressing what many Americans considered to be
complex, well-documented problems directly related - indeed, central - to the
integrity of the political system. And in both, the systemic problems were, oddly
enough, products of constitutional "freedoms" taken to logical extremes. In
Morrison, the problem was the absence of any real check - whether in the form of
judicial review or expedient legislative recourse - on the president's power to spare
his high-level appointees from investigation or prosecution for possible criminal mis-
conduct. The absence of a structural check was a function of branch independence
under the separation of powers doctrine. Congress sought to address the problem
by creating the office of independent counsel, endowed with prosecutorial power yet
removed from direct presidential control. The problem, then, arose from the sepa-
ration of powers, yet the legal framework for testing the reform legislation was the
334 John McCain, Reclaiming Our Democracy: The Way Forward, 3 ELECTION L.J. 115,
115 (2004).
... Richard L. Hasen, Buckley Is Dead, Long Live Buckley: The New Campaign Finance
Incoherence ofMcConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 31,59 (2004).
336 Justice Breyer has noted that this rationale aims "to democratize the influence that
money can bring to bear upon the electoral process, thereby building public confidence in
that process, broadening the base of a candidate's meaningful financial support, and encourag-
ing greater public participation." Breyer, supra note 135, at 253.
33' For example, Professor Hasen has explained that what was missing from McConnell
was careful balancing of competing constitutional interests, and serious policing for incum-
bent legislators' self-interest. Hasen, supra note 335, at 60. Professor Issacharoff has noted
that McConnell features "the almost complete absence of such conventional First Amendment
concerns" as "the need for the regulation and tightness of fit between state objectives and
means taken." Samuel Issacharoff, Throwing in the Towel: The Constitutional Morass of
Campaign Finance, 3 ELECTION L.J. 259, 261 (2004).
33' 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
339 Id.
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separation of powers doctrine itself. Applying a functionalist framework, 4 the Court
examined the legislation for signs of balanced relations between the independent
counsel and all three branches, and finding a balance, upheld the statute."' While
many Americans later rued, perhaps rightly, the legislation's wisdom, the Court's ana-
lytic approach in Morrison was not terribly surprising. If the logic of the separation
of powers contributed to a serious problem going to the heart of the system's
integrity, the Court's unwillingness to apply the same logic strictly in evaluating the
reform made sense: better to defer to the political branches as long as the statute in-
cluded a process of internal checks on its operations.
McConnell resembles Morrison in important respects. McConnell's systemic
problem - an increase in popular distrust of government, heightened by popular
revulsion against elections due to the perceived role of corporate money and its use
for candidate advertisements - arose in part from constitutional protections of speech
and press. Congress enacted BCRA in response. If the logic of the First Amend-
ment helped create a serious civic problem, deferring to the political branches may
have been more democratic than strictly applying the logic that created the problem
in the first place, particularly given the statute's authorization of corporate and union
use of segregated funds for electioneering communications. 2
But McConnell seems more than the product of a new theory of deference. It is
also the outcome of practical surmise about a subtle question: how do citizens think?
The case's opinions are replete with speculation about perceptions of corruption and
endearments. The justices were pressed to give realistic consideration to how the
living, breathing citizen regards politics and influence, the professed linkages between
money and policy. The question presented in this Article - how the disenchanted
citizen is won back to civic life - appeared to be central. The McConnell majority
may have rushed to the judgments that citizens see corruption almost everywhere
in the system, and that they link even televised advertisements to unseemly access.
On the other hand, the dissenters may have been too dismissive of the risks posed
to participation by the status quo. In the end, the symbolism of reform prevailed;
Hercules appeared on the high ledge, signaled the priority of reform, and a decision
was made. The only difference is that the justices in McConnell had none of
Hercules's power to command Philoctetes back to the army and on to Troy. The
McConnell Court could only uphold BCRA and hope that disengaged citizens would
respond to the symbolism on their own. By the time of the election of 2004, however,
many voters were back anyway. Even as money found new routes of entry into the
310 Id. at 691 (formulating the question under the separation of powers doctrine as whether
the statute's restriction on presidential power to remove the independent counsel "unduly
trammels on executive authority").
34 Id. at 692 (holding that, despite restrictions on the removal power, "the Executive,
through the Attorney General, retains ample authority to assure that the counsel is compe-
tently performing his or her statutory responsibilities in a manner that comports with the
provisions of the Act").
32 McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 204-07 (2003).
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system, war and fear - and the media's unique power to package it all - brought
many back to the voting booths, if not to energetic dialogue. But for how long?
CONCLUSION
1. A process account of the First Amendment looks at the workings of speech
in both the society as a whole and in the psychology of the questioning, often
dissatisfied citizen. The account has multiple strands and does not point to a single
answer in every case. This Article has attempted to explore and bring into the open
some of the complexities of this account, so that legal disagreements over self-
governance can begin to find a clearer, workable vocabulary.
2. In the cases studied, the justices had to appreciate that they lacked such a
vocabulary and hence a firm grasp of the workings of American democracy at the
start of the twenty-first century. In McIntyre, they were unnerved by a citizen who
wished to make a statement but refused to stand up and be publicly identified with
it. In Bartnicki, they were unsettled not by what a speaker wished to omit from his
public speech, but what he wished to put in: someone else's private phone conver-
sation. In White, they puzzled over a system of popular judicial elections that in-
cluded a code of unmentionables to be followed, under threat of disbarment, by all
candidates for the bench. And in McConnell, they considered a massive law that
sought to advance democracy by cutting back on a range of speech. Where was the
First Amendment, where was citizenship, and where were the words for either?
The justices fell back on values, those underlying dictates that recall why the
First Amendment exists. Chief among them was self-governance. A shape-shifter,
the self-governance value has elements of substance and process, but both are poorly
defined and infrequently considered. What divided the justices were multiple, con-
tentious understandings of self-governance. Most of the justices saw the contours
of a social process account - the liberty/language dynamic, in which positive and
negative liberties interact. But they divided in deploying different aspects of the
"individual process" account.
3. Although much of the self-governance value can be explained, it remains a
partial mystery because at its heart is the citizen, Philoctetes, wary of politics,
uncertain of his next move. He may make himself visible when society points to
needs more pressing than his own (Sophocles); he may step forward from the
sidelines when a friend unshackles discussion and releases the "fission and fusion"
of a communal bond (Heaney); or he may find a stance by his own searching use of
language - to push off from the past and construct verbal bridges between public
and private concerns (Scott). If he is Kumar, we think of him as homeless but
situated, expecting change if not quite believing in it, searching for the good Indian
yet writing in English. Scott's final novel revisits many of the characters of the earlier
books but never mentions Kumar.34 3 We imagine that, as part of his truce, Kumar
has disappeared into India, part of a process where self-governance takes the next
step, from speech to the speech that is action.
"' PAUL ScoTr, STAYING ON (1977).
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